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Legal and Policy Tools to Restrict
Online Cigar Advertisement
By PATRICIA A. DAVIDSON & CHRISTOPHER N. BANTHIN*
THE PROLIFERATION OF cigar advertising and the rise in cigar
smoking, particularly among young Americans, has captured nation-
wide attention of public policy-makers. In 1997, the first study of teen-
age cigar smoking in the United States revealed that cigars have
become popular with adolescents.' Although cigar sales began flatten-
ing in 1998, youth cigar smoking remains a serious public health
problem in the United States.2
Cigar advertising and promotion on the Internet is both accessi-
ble and attractive to adolescents. A recent study suggests that the In-
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1. See NATIONAL CANCER INST., NATIONAL INST. OF HEALTH, CIGARS: HEALTH EFFECTS
AND TPENDS (Smoking and Tobacco Control Monograph 9) 19 (1998) [hereinafter NA-
TIONAL CANCER INST. MONOGRAPH]; see also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVEN-
TION, CIGAR SMOKING AMONG TEENAGERS-UNITED STATES, MASSACHUSETTS, AND NEW YORK,
1996, 46 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 433 (May 23, 1997) [hereinafter CDC
1996 REPORT]. Nearly 27% of U.S. and 28.1% of Massachusetts high school students re-
ported smoking at least one cigar in 1996 and 13-15% of ninth graders in two New York
counties smoked cigars during the month preceding the survey. See id. at 434.
2. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, TOBACCO USE AMONG HIGH
SCHOOL STUDENTS-UNITED STATES, 1997, 47 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT
229-33 (Apr. 3, 1998) [hereinafter CDC 1997 REPORT]; see also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL AND PREVENTION, TOBACCO USE AMONG MIDDLE AND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS-
UNITED STATES, 1999, 49 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 49 Uan. 28, 2000)
[hereinafter CDC 1999 REPORT].
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ternet is providing the cigar industry with significant access to
underage users. 3 The Internet is readily available to the young, reach-
ing them at school, during their recreation and leisure time, and in
their homes. The tobacco industry's history of targeting underage
users through various media warrants some consumer protection leg-
islation or regulation of cigar advertisements on the Internet.
This Article identifies and analyzes the legal tools for restricting
cigar advertising on the Internet. Part I reviews the growth and unique
features of the World Wide Web ("Web"), cigar advertising and sales
on the Web, adolescent cigar smoking, and existing technology to re-
strict youth access to online cigar advertisements. Part II analyzes sev-
eral possible sources of federal authority for regulating Internet cigar
advertising and briefly examines related past and pending federal leg-
islation. Part II asserts that the jurisdiction of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission ("FCC") to oversee the statutory ban on advertising
of certain products through any electronic medium should be ex-
tended to include cigars. Part III considers the potential for state reg-
ulation of cigar advertising on the Internet, concluding that a federal
solution is preferable. Finally, Part IV discusses the First Amendment
"free speech" issues raised by a restriction on Internet cigar advertis-
ing and suggests that a law limited to commercial speech should with-
stand a constitutional challenge. This Article concludes that there are
viable alternatives for regulation of cigar advertising on the Internet,
and any one of them should withstand a constitutional challenge if
developed carefully.
I. Cigar Promotion and Sales on the Internet
A. History and Technology of the Internet
The extraordinary growth of the Internet to date is evidence of
the expanded role it has come to play in the lives of many Americans.
In only six years, the number of Americans online has risen from 1.3
million to an estimated 80 million in 1999.4 Not only are the potential
numbers of different users important, but the new communication
products that will be offered over the Internet's infrastructure are also
3. See Ruth E. Malone & Lisa A. Bero, Cigars, Youth, and the Internet Link, 90 AM. J. OF
PUB. HEAriH 790 (2000).
4. See Jason Oxman, FCC, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet 3-4 (Office of
Plans and Policy Working Paper No. 31, July 1999), republished at <http://www.fcc.gov/
Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp31 .txt>.
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important.5 Few can doubt that, in the years to come, the ubiquity and
versatility of the Internet will dominate communication throughout
our lives.
Rooted in a United States defense project begun in the late 1960s
called ARPANET, the Internet has since become a collection of pub-
licly and privately owned networks.6 Data is automatically routed
through this array of networks without direct human monitoring. 7
The Internet is also non-centralized;8 if a pathway fails, data merely
travels an alternate course to its intended destination. 9 The flow of
data is not controlled by geographical boundaries, no matter what
path is taken to reach the data's destination.10
From the user's vantage point, the Internet is a versatile tool that
provides direct communication among end users." Either through in-
dividual connections or organizations, such as universities or busi-
nesses, end users send and receive information. 12 The information is
divided into packets, each of which is guided through various physical
networks to its destination by "routers," which "examine [a] packet's
address information and determine where to send it next."13 Local
networks, known as Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"), link end users
5. The key to the Internet's ability to accommodate various forms of media is the
Internet Protocols ("lPs"). These IPs overlay the physical networks of the Internet to create
one logical network. See Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and Telecommunications Services:
Universal Service Mechanisms, Access Charges, and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System, 16 YALE
J. ON REG. 211, 215 (1999). As an extremely flexible vehicle for communication, IPs allow
innovators to implement their technologies quickly by loading it onto the existing Internet
infrastructure. See Kevin Werbach, FCC, Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications
Policy 5-6 (Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper No. 29, Mar. 1997), republished at
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp29pdf.html>.
6. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-50 (1997). The Internet began as a military
communication project in 1969 called ARPANET. See Werbach, supra note 5, at 13. It al-
lowed the military, some defense contractors, and certain universities to share information
through redundant, non-centralized networks, which the Department of Defense hoped
would remain viable even if partially destroyed. See id. Later, universities developed similar
networks, and in the mid-1980s, the National Science Foundation ("NSF") established the
NSFNET, a major communication pathway that continues to carry much of the Internet's
data. See id. In the early 1990s, commercial entities began to create other major communi-
cation pathways, and, on April 30, 1995, the NSF stopped funding NSFNET and placed it
in private hands. See id.
7. See Robert Kline, Freedom of Speech on the Electronic Village Green: Applying the First
Amendment Lessons of Cable Television to the Internet, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 26
(1996).
8. See id. at 26.
9. See id.
10. See American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 174-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
11. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 849-50.
12. See Werbach, supra note 5, at 10.
13. Weinberg, supra note 5, at 215.
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to "backbone providers," who lease or own main fiber optic or copper
lines that connect major population centers. 14
Linking the various physical networks, the Internet Protocols cre-
ate one seamless network.15 Internet Protocol technologies allow users
to communicate directly across sometimes vastly different physical net-
works and to employ a range of communication products. 16 The most
common vehicles for data on the Internet have been grouped into six
product categories: "one-to-one messaging (such as 'e-mail'); one-to-
many messaging (such as 'listserv'); distributed message databases
(such as USENET newsgroups); real time communication (such as
'Internet Relay Chat'); real time remote computer utilization (such as
'Telnet'); and remote information retrieval (such as 'ftp,' 'gopher'
and the 'World Wide Web') ."'17
B. Commercialization of the World Wide Web
One of the most popular categories of communication offered
over the Internet is the World Wide Web.' 8 It consists of a "vast num-
ber of documents stored in different computers all over the world."' 19
More elaborate documents known as Web pages, or sites, often in-
clude graphics, video, and audio. Web pages can also incorporate
other Internet services such as chat rooms and hyperlinks. Chat rooms
facilitate virtual conversations between users; hyperlinks allow users to
visit other Web documents or sites. 2 °1
The versatility of the Web has drawn an increasing number of
commercial interests to use this communications medium. Retailers
and manufacturers know "[t]he Web is attractive to consumers of all
ages because a wide array of products and services are offered in an
environment which [ostensibly] attempts to provide those consumers
with full information."2 1 Low entry costs, combined with accessibility to
14. See Werbach, supra note 5, at 12. The Internet also includes satellite and wireless
networks at both the local and backbone provider levels. See FCC, Connecting the Globe, a
Regulator's Guide to Building a Global Information Community (visited Mar. 7, 2000) <http://
www.fcc.gov/connectglobe/sec9.html>. Backbone providers can also act as ISPs, enabling
end users to directly connect to a backbone network. See id.
15. See Weinberg, supra note 5, at 215.
16. See Werbach, supra note 5, at 17-19.
17. Angela E. Wu, Spinning a Tighter Web: The First Amendment and Internet Regulation,
17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 263, 269-70 (1997) (citations omitted).
18. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997).
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (emphasis added), affd,
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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virtually any demographic area or market, has triggered an explosion
of commercial Web sites.22 Approximately one-third of the 3.5 million
Web sites currently in existence are commercial sites intended to gen-
erate a profit.23 "Commercial activity on the Internet in this country,
estimated to be over 100 billion dollars by the end of [1999], is ex-
pected to more than double [in the year 2000]."24 By the year 2003, it
is estimated that the Internet will generate e-commerce revenues of
between 1.4 to 3 trillion dollars. 25
C. Cigar Advertisements on the World Wide Web
Cigar manufacturers, importers, promoters, and retailers (collec-
tively, "cigar industry" or "industry"), like other companies, are follow-
ing the trend toward commercial exploitation of products over the
Internet. In 1998, concerned with the recent surge in cigar consump-
tion and new health information, the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") ordered the five leading domestic cigar manufacturers to sub-
mit detailed information on the industry's advertising and promotion
expenditures for 1996 and 1997.26 The data revealed that industry ex-
penditures on Internet advertising of cigars had increased by 180%
over this period.27 The FTC cautioned that its report substantially un-
derestimated the actual increase in cigar advertising on the Internet
because the report failed to include indirect cigar advertising, such as
online magazines like Cigar Aficionado.28 Additionally, the report only
reflected expenditures by leading manufacturers, and not advertising
run independently by tobacco retailers. 29 The relatively low cost and
widespread availability of Web site software 30 suggests retailers com-
prise a large percentage of actual cigar advertising on the Internet.
Furthermore, online cigar retailers-other than the seven cigar manu-
22. See id. at 486.
23. See id.
24. Oxman, supra note 4, at 4.
25. See Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 486.
26. See FTC, Report to Congress: Cigar Sales and Advertising and Promotional Expenditures
for Calendar Years 1996 and 1997, 2 (1999) (visited May 8, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/
1999/9907/cigarreportl999.htm> (footnote omitted) [hereinafter K!'C 1996-97 Report].
27. See id. at 4.
28. See id. Furthermore, recently proposed Consent Orders-entered into by the
FTC-requiring cigar manufacturers, importers, and promoters to put warnings on certain
cigar packaging and advertising would not cover Internet advertising unless it is paid for, at
least in part, by one of the named parties. The proposed Consent Orders are discussed in
depth infra Part II.A.
29. See FI'C 1996-97 Report, supra note 26, at 2, 5.
30. See Rena, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 486.
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facturers named in a Consent Order recently adopted by the FTC re-
quiring health warnings to be displayed on cigar packages and
advertisements 31-are not required to include the FTC's cigar health
warnings in their online advertisements. 3 2
Like other e-commerce companies, the cigar industry uses Web
sites as the primary Internet tool to promote its products.33 Cigar Web
sites collectively provide a forum for the tobacco industry to continue
its use of persuasive, yet uninformative, advertising. 34 As with Phillip
Morris's Marlboro Man, cigar-oriented Web sites seek to promote a
smoking lifestyle. 35 Many Web sites convey an implicit message that
cigar smoking is "cool," through advice sections such as a "Guide to
Looking Cool When You Smoke," photos of celebrities smoking ci-
gars, and reviews of movies that feature cigar smoking. 36 Often cigar
Web sites employ advertising tools, such as cartoons, moving images,
and music or sportswear sales, all of which appeal particularly to mi-
nors. 37 In an egregious example, a Web site displayed a popular televi-
sion cartoon character smoking a cigar.33 Another site showed a child
modeling a promotional shirt for a cigar retailer.3 9 Although the cigar
industry may assert that children rarely visit ostensibly adult-oriented
cigar Web sites, search terms such as "games," "entertainment," "mu-
sic," "contest," and "Halloween" call up tobacco-related Web pages. 40
Health warnings are notably absent from most cigar industry Web
sites. A recent survey conducted by Ruth E. Malone and Lisa A. Bero 4'
("Malone-Bero Survey") found that only 3.5% of cigar-related Web
sites post health warnings. 42 One such warning stated, "Cigars are
31. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
32. See FTC, Analysis of Proposed Consent Orders to Aid Public Comment, at 1-2 (visited
Sept. 21, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/06/cigarsanalysis.htm>.
33. See Malone & Bero, supra note 3, at 790.
34. See Constitutionality of Tobacco 1997 Global Settlement Legislation Before the Senate Com-
merce Comm., 105th Cong. 19 (1998), available at 1998 WL 11517928, at *19 (statement of
David C. Vladeck, Director Public Citizen Litigation Group).
35. See CENTER FOR MEDIA EDUCATION, YOUTH ACCESS TO ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO WEB
MARKETING: THE FILTERING AND RATING DEBATE, at 9 (Oct. 1999) <http://www.cme.org/
publications/scrnfltr/report104.pdf> [hereinafter CME YOUTH ACCESS REPORT].
36. Id.
37. See Malone & Bero, supra note 3, at 791. Approximately one-third of cigar Web
sites used cartoons, moving images, music, and sportswear. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See CME YOUTH ACCESS REPORT, supra note 35, at 9.
41. See Malone & Bero, supra note 3.
42. See id. at 791. Ruth E. Malone, Ph.D. R.N., and Lisa A. Bero, Ph.D., are both with
the Institute for Health Policy Studies, School of Medicine, and Department of Clinical
Pharmacy, School of Pharmacy, at the University of California, San Francisco. See id. at 790.
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known to the State of California to be bad for you and cause great
discomfort to the political correctness and lifestyle police. ' 43 This mes-
sage is a far cry from the direct warnings the federal government cur-
rently requires for advertisements of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
products. 44 Instead, the tone of the cigar Web site's purported warn-
ing may undermine important health information and could even
link smoking with rebellious behavior, which appeals to many young
people.
A second Internet tool, which the cigar industry has also em-
braced to promote cigar use, is the hyperlink. A hyperlink typically
consists of text or images, often in the form of a banner advertise-
ment, with direct access to another Web document or site where the
user may obtain related information. 45 Like billboards, hyperlinks are
not restricted to adult-oriented Web sites. In March 2000, Cubanci-
gars.com, Inc., an e-commerce cigar company, bought advertising
space and placed banners on Microsoft's Internet network, MSN, one
of the most popular Internet services in the United States.46 Six
months earlier, the Havana Group, Inc. purchased a direct link to its
Web site through Yahoo! Shopping.47 The willingness to buy advertis-
ing space on these heavily traveled Web sites reflects the importance
to the cigar industry of using hyperlinks to promote cigar use.
Cigar industry hyperlinks present additional concerns regarding
the exposure of young people to cigar advertisements. First, Web sites
like MSN and Yahoo! provide a starting point, or portal, to the Web.
Advertisements on such Web sites have the first crack at attracting pro-
spective customers to their sites. Additionally, hyperlinks eliminate al-
most all search steps normally used to locate Web sites on a particular
topic. The user simply clicks on the banner to enter another Web site
of related information. In light of such technology, it is unclear who
43. Id. at 791.
44. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994) (mandating warning labels for cigarette adver-
tising); 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (mandating warning labels for
smokeless tobacco advertising). Although the FTC recently proposed agreements to re-
quire warnings on cigar packaging and advertising, see FTC, News Release, fTC Announces
Settlements Requiring Disclosure of Cigar Health Risks, June 26, 2000, available in 2000 WL
817312, at *2, the marketing controls and other provisions featured in the agreements fall
short of what is currently mandated for other tobacco products. See discussion infra Part
II.A.2.
45. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997).
46. See Cuban Cigars for Sale in Chicago, P.R. NEWSWIRE (visited Mar. 29, 2000) <http://
wwwl .internetwire.com/iwire/release-clickthrough?release-id=7255&category=business>.
47. See Yahoo! Finance, The Havana Group, Inc. Launches Smokecheap.com (visited Sept.
21, 2000) <http://www.priceclick.com/havgroupincl.html>.
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actually controls what one views on the Web. The passive user, the
uninitiated, or the impressionable youth is essentially steered toward
certain Web sites.
D. Cigar Sales on the World Wide Web
The cigar industry, like the entire tobacco industry, has done lit-
tle to prohibit or even dissuade minors from purchasing its products
over the Internet. 48 Many of the hundreds of Web sites that promote
cigar smoking sell cigars either directly online, or by providing a tele-
phone number that users can call to purchase cigars. 49 As state and
local tobacco control laws restrict youth access to local cigar retailers,
many buyers and sellers will turn to the Internet.50
The Malone-Bero Survey identified several factors that lead to on-
line cigar sales to minors. 5' First, the survey revealed that 32% of cigar
industry Web sites provided the purchaser with the option of paying
by cash-on-delivery or by money order.52 In contrast, most e-com-
merce Web sites request that consumers pay for items with a credit
card.53 While not a fail-safe determinate of age, minors are less likely
to have access to a credit card and, if they do, there is at least a record
of the purchase.5 4 The cigar industry's practice of accepting payment
either by cash-on-delivery or a money order eliminates even this par-
tial protection.
Additionally, the Malone-Bero Survey revealed that a user is
rarely required to provide his or her age. Fewer than 10% of cigar-
48. See, e.g., Owen Moritz, Smoking Gun vs. Web: Kids as Young as 7 Buy Cigs On-line, By
Mail, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 14, 2000, at 4.
49. See Malone & Bero, supra note 3, at 790.
50. Jurisprudence under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution has
frustrated efforts to apply local tobacco control laws to the Internet. See Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly, 84 F. Supp. 2d 180, 202 (D. Mass. 2000) (noting the court would have "grave
[Commerce Clause] concerns" if state cigar regulations were found to apply to the In-
ternet). State and local tobacco control laws are incredibly important. Internet sales, how-
ever, add a new wrinkle that necessitates federal legislation to avoid Commerce Clause
issues. Such issues are further addressed later in this Article. See discussion infra Part III.A.
51. See discussion supra Part I.C.
52. See Malone & Bero, supra note 3, at 790.
53. See FTC, Guide to Online Payments (visited June 6, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
con-line/pubs/payments.htm>.
54. Requiring a credit card especially in conjunction with an image of a driver's li-
cense provides at least some extra protection against youth access. See Carole Said, Online
Sale of Tobacco Drawing A Fight: Critics Say Tax, Age Laws Must Apply to Web Market, S.F.
CHRON., May 29, 2000, at Al. R.J. Reynolds, which offers to sell almost all of its products
online, requires online consumers to verify that they are smokers and over 21, to provide a
credit card, and to submit personal data. See id.
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related Web sites require users to communicate their age affirmatively
to the Web site's proprietor by clicking on a box, typing in their age,
or by some other technique. 55 Approximately 25% of cigar-related
Web sites contained a less effective "passive" statement about the legal
smoking age. For example:
We believe that smoking is an adult pleasure. The appreciation of
our premium products is a mature reward won over time, as is true
of all things in life in which only an adult can discern the potential
for pleasure. Freedom of choice is an inherent American value and
the decision to smoke is an exercise of that freedom. Also, inher-
ent is our responsability [sic] to properly restrict those not mature
enought [sic] to make these choices .... We therefore ask you to
* . . be aware . . . that we specifically require an "adult sugnature"
[sic] upon delivery.56
This warning's tone seems well calculated to entice adolescents to take
up smoking as a sign of independence and maturity.
Although there is no comprehensive data on Internet cigar sales
to minors, law enforcement agents have responded, at least partially,
to the online sale of some tobacco products. In December 1999, the
Attorney General for the State of Washington, in partnership with six-
teen other states' attorneys general, caught five online tobacco retail-
ers who were selling to minors.5 7 Cease and desist orders were issued
after seventeen and twelve year old operatives ordered the hand-
rolled, flavored tobacco product called bidis58 over the Internet with-
out having to verify their ages. 59 The products were purchased both
online and using a telephone number posted on a Web site and were
delivered without a request for an adult signature. 60 Only one of the
retailers, all of which were located within the United States, asked for
the purchaser's age.6 1
There can be little doubt that the Internet provides the cigar in-
dustry with a powerful marketing and sales tool. The Internet gives
the cigar industry access to virtually any demographic market. While
55. See Malone & Bero, supra note 3, at 790.
56. Id. at 791 (quoting Nat Sherman: Tobacconist to the World Since 1930 <http://www.
natsherman.com>).
57. See In re Ziggy's Tobacco & Novelty, No. 14.8 TPLR 2.492 (Wash. State Liquor
Control Board, Dec. 21, 1999) (Order to Cease and Desist Internet Sales of Tobacco to
Minors) [hereinafter Ziggy's Order].
58. Bidis are manufactured in India and sold in the United States. They are produced
in a variety of flavors, including chocolate, vanilla, strawberry, and mango. See Lucio
Guerro, Movement Grows to Ban Bidi Cigarettes, CHI. SUN TIMES, Apr. 12, 2000, at 24.
59. See Ziggy's Order, supra note 57, at 1-2.
60. See id. at 2.
61. See id. The retailer did not request any supporting information. See id.
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there is no conclusive data on the consequences of such direct access
to certain demographics, adolescents seem particularly vulnerable.
E. Youth Cigar Smoking
Cigar smoking in the United States increased sharply throughout
much of the 1990s, reversing a thirty-year decline. 62 This increase fol-
lowed a period of intensive and apparently successful marketing and
promotion by the cigar industry.63 The new cigar smokers include
those of adolescent age, and even younger children.
64
In 1997, the Centers for Disease Control & Protection ("CDC")
documented surprisingly high cigar smoking rates among underage
teenagers. 65 Indeed, one well-known tobacco researcher opined, in re-
sponse to the information about teen cigar smoking, that
"[e]veryone's been caught napping.'' 66 The CDC reported similarly
high rates of youth cigar smoking nationally again in 1998.67 Some
state studies in 1997 and 1998 revealed that cigar smoking among
youths began as early as sixth grade and increased markedly by the
eighth grade and high school. 6
8
While cigar smoking appears to have dipped slightly among ado-
lescents in 1999,69 teenage cigar smoking-along with the use of
62. See NATIONAL CANCER INST. MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 19. The period from
1993 to 1998 were apparently the peak years, with sales of at least large premium cigars
starting to flatten in 1998. See id. While recent data indicates that cigar sales have
plateaued, there are still more cigar smokers today than there were before the boom be-
gan. See Mya Frazier, Cigar Craze Now More Ash Than Smoke, CINCINNATI Bus. COURIER, Feb.
7, 2000, at 1.
63. See NATIONAL CANCER INST. MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 14-17, 195-219. This
report of the National Cancer Institute notes that the multi-faceted promotional campaign
featured: placement of cigars in popular films; media coverage of cigar use emphasizing
glamour and ignoring health concerns; publication of new cigar life-style magazines, such
as Cigar Aficionado, peppered with celebrity appearances; establishment of cigar bars in
trendy neighborhoods and cigar clubs on college campuses; and cigar advertising and pro-
motion on the Internet. See id.
64. See id. at 42.
65. See CDC 1996 REPORT, supra note 1, at 434. Nearly 27% of United States high
school students and 28.1% of Massachusetts high school students reported smoking at least
one cigar in 1996, and 13-15% of ninth graders in two New York counties smoked cigars
during the month preceding the survey. See id. at 434.
66. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Cigar Fad Reported to be Recruiting Legions of Teen-Agers,
N.Y.TIMES, May 23, 1997, at A24 (quoting Dr. John Pierce, Director of Cancer Prevention
at the University of California, San Diego).
67. See CDC 1997 REPORT, supra note 2, at 229.
68. See id. at 229 (reporting Massachusetts survey results); NATIONAL CANCER INST.
MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 19 (same); see also Bob LaMendola & Glenn Singer, Teen Cigar
Smoking Is on the Rise, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 26, 1999, at 6B.
69. See CDC 1999 REPORT, supra note 2, at 49.
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other alternative tobacco products such as bidis-remains a signifi-
cant public health problem and challenge to tobacco control. 70 Re-
sults of a teen focus group study of American adolescent cigar use
revealed that teens believe cigar use is increasing among their peers, 71
an ominous indicator that social norms of the young support under-
age cigar smoking. The growth in teen cigar smoking, and in its ap-
parent social acceptability, 72 is likely related to the glamorization and
promotion of cigar use.7 3
F. Mechanisms to Block Youth Access to Cigar Web Sites
The lack of an effective mechanism to determine the age of an
Internet user is a key obstacle to restricting young people's access to
Web sites selling or advertising cigars. This was one of the main rea-
sons the United States Supreme Court concluded that a federal law
attempting to prevent minors from viewing indecent material online
violated the First Amendment, in Reno v. ACLU.7 4
While users can be asked their age when they visit a Web site,
there is no reliable way to verify this information. Moreover, as re-
vealed in the Malone-Bero Survey, efforts to screen out or discourage
minors are tepid at best.75 Indeed, many of the age-related messages
on cigar sites may actually be designed to entice young people to
smoke cigars.76
Credit cards are often required for online shopping or, in the
case of online pornographic sites, as a method of blocking underage
70. Cigar smoking causes oral, esophogeal, laryngeal, and lung cancer. See NATIONAL
CANCER INST. MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 19. A serious risk of coronary disease has also
been associated with cigar smoking. See id.; see also Eric J. Jacobs et al., Cigar Smoking and
Death From Coronary Heart Disease in a Prospective Study of U.S. Men, 159 ARCHIVES INT. MED.
2413 (1999); Carlos Iribarren et al., Effect of Cigar Smoking on the Risk of Cardiovascular Dis-
ease, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, and Cancer in Men, 340 N. ENG. J. MED. 1773
(1999). To date, however, all of the cigar health studies have been limited to adult male
subjects who regularly smoke cigars. See id. "Regular cigar smoking is generally defined to
mean daily smoking." Id. Rigorous scientific studies of the health effects of occasional cigar
smoking and cigar smoking of all types among women and adolescents are needed.
71. See Department of Health and Human Servs., Office of Inspector General, Youth
Use of Cigars: Patterns of Use and Perception, at ii (1999).
72. A startling 55% of teens from the focus group reported that adults permit teens to
smoke cigars. See id. at 16.
73. The 1999 teen focus group study reported, for example, that teen participants
were able to recall 26 different television shows depicting cigar smoking. See id. at 12.
74. 521 U.S. 844, 855-57 (1997). See discussion infra Part IV.
75. See Malone & Bero, supra note 3, at 790-91. For example, only five sites provided
health warning, and the warnings of two of those sites were merely "sarcastic messages." Id.
at 791.
76. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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access. The Supreme Court in Reno was critical of these efforts because
they place an economic burden on both senders and recipients of on-
line speech. 77 Furthermore, in Reno, the Justices pointed out that,
ironically, a credit card requirement would shield commercial purvey-
ors of pornography while leaving private "transmitters of indecent
messages that have significant social or artistic value" vulnerable to
criminal prosecution. 78
The merits and efficacy of relying on a credit card as a tool for
verifying age over the Internet is certainly debatable. Furthermore,
the Malone-Bero Survey revealed that surprisingly few of the Web sites
selling cigars require credit cards to make an online purchase. 79 It is
possible that the policy of allowing cash-on-delivery purchases is de-
signed to facilitate youth sales,8 0 particularly considering that many
children and adolescents are at home alone after school, and are thus
more readily in a position to accept delivery.
In Reno, where provisions of a federal law intended to protect mi-
nors from indecent online material were ruled unconstitutional, the
United States Supreme Court relied heavily on the district court's
1996 findings of fact regarding the nature and capacity of the In-
ternet. Due to the changing nature of Internet technology, at least
some of the "facts" on which Reno was based might not be considered
accurate today.8' For example, the Supreme Court accepted without
question the prediction that filtering software would enable parents to
effectively protect their minor children from viewing adult material
on the Internet. 2 It may have been reasonable in 1996 to make this
assumption. Indeed, filtering software is now available to parents who
seek to limit the content of material their children view on the In-
ternet.8 3 However, filtering software has not yet proven to be as effec-
77. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 856.
78. Id. at 882 n.47.
79. See Malone & Bero, supra note 3, at 790. The study found that slightly less than
half (49%) of the Web sites selling cigars required credit card payments. See id. Thirty-two
percent expressly stated that they accepted cash-on-delivery or money orders, options that
are likely to be popular with underage buyers. See id.
80. See id.
81. For a discussion of the degree of control a user has over what is viewed on the
Internet, see supra Part I.C.
82. "[T]he evidence indicates 'a reasonably effective method by which parents can
prevent their children from accessing sexually explicit and other material which parents
may believe is inappropriate for their children will soon be widely available."' Reno, 521
U.S. at 855 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
83. A recent report, critiquing the options for filtering or screening tobacco and alco-
hol advertising on the Internet, summarizes product categories and mechanisms for
screening and filtering. See CME YOUTH ACCESS REPORT, supra note 35, at 11. The report
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tive as its proponents may have hoped.8 4 Further, such software has a
demonstrably poor record for blocking access by minors to tobacco-
or alcohol-related sites on the Web.85
In 1999, the Center for Media Education ("CME") released a fol-
low-up report8 6 to its earlier study revealing the prevalence of youth-
oriented Web sites promoting tobacco (especially cigars) and alcohol
use.87 The latest CME report examined six filtering software pro-
grams. In its study, the CME found that only one program (Surf
Watch) blocked access to more than half of the identified sites pro-
moting tobacco and alcohol.8 8 One program (X-Stop) failed to block
any of the tobacco and alcohol sites and another (Net Nanny) only
blocked one of the sites tested.89
The 1999 CME Youth Access Report points out that links between
advertising and youth consumption of tobacco have long been estab-
lished.90 Moreover, it asserts that the Web is a particularly appealing
advertising medium for targeting children and teenagers, who are
drawn to and proficient with its interactive features (such as games,
drawings, and contests) .91 In addition to revealing the flaws of alcohol
and tobacco Web site filtering programs, the CME report states that
interviews with software developers suggest "screening of alcohol and
tobacco sites has not been a priority."92 The report hypothesizes that
software developers believe parents are more concerned about screen-
ing pornography and "protecting children from pedophiles or 'life-
threatening' experiences," and devote most of their resources to these
areas. 93 Without disputing the importance of blocking such content,
the report urges the public health community, private companies, the
government, and parents to make the development, implementation,
identifies the following product categories: "filtering and blocking software; filtered ISPs;
browsers for children; child-friendly search engines; PICS ratings; and monitoring
software." Id. at 11-14.
84. See id. at 2-3.
85. See id. at 19-20.
86. See CME YOUTH AcCESS REPORT, supra note 35.
87. See Center for Media Education, Alcohol and Tobacco on the Web: New Threats to Youth
(Mar. 1997) <http://www.cme.org/children/marketing/execsum.html>.
88. See CME YOUTH AcCESs REPORT, supra note 35, at 3.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 9 & nn.9-11. Alcohol advertising has also been shown to influence youth
drinking. See id. at 10 & n.13.
91. See id. at 8-9.
92. Id. at 10.
93. Id.
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and enforcement of effective tobacco and alcohol screening devices
on the Internet a high priority.94
Unfortunately, these recommendations have not yet been
heeded. Today, there are no effective mechanisms for blocking chil-
dren or teenagers from viewing cigar or tobacco advertising and pro-
motional Web sites on the Internet, or even from purchasing tobacco
products (especially cigars) online. In light of the market's failure to
supply mechanisms needed to aid parents in restricting youth access,
certain federal agencies or Congress should enact relevant consumer
protection laws.
II. Federal Regulation of Cigar Advertising and Promotion
on the Internet
There are three potential sources of federal regulation of adver-
tising and promotion of cigars over the Internet: the Federal Trade
Commission, the Federal Communication Commission, and the Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA"). The FTC is charged with enforce-
ment of "a variety of consumer protection laws,'9 5 and is perhaps the
best candidate to lead a concerted effort to limit the cigar industry's
online marketing campaign. In June 2000, the FTC entered into Con-
sent Orders with the seven leading cigar manufacturers, importers,
and marketers requiring health warnings on cigar packaging and on
advertising, including some Internet advertising. 96
Alternatively, an existing ban by the FCC against tobacco adver-
tisement on "any medium of electronic commerce subject to the juris-
diction of the [FCC]"'9 7 could be extended to include cigars, which is
more consistent with current federal marketing restrictions. Although
it espouses a non-regulatory approach to the Internet, the FCC has
asserted jurisdiction over the Internet.9"
94. See id. at 44.
95. FTC, Vision, Mission & Goals (visited May 8, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/mis-
sion.htm>.
96. The Consent Orders contain other marketing restrictions. See discussion infra Part
II.A.2.
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 4402(I) (1994). Section 1335 restricts cigarette and little cigars
advertisements on mediums under FCC's jurisdiction, see id. § 1335, while § 4402(f) re-
stricts smokeless tobacco advertisements on mediums under FCC's jurisdiction, see id.
§ 4402(f).
98. See Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 205 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (citing In re Amendment of 64.702 of the Commission's Rules & Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 391-93 (1980) [hereinafter Computer II
Final Order]).
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In addition to regulation by the FTC and the FCC, there is poten-
tial for the FDA to regulate tobacco products.99 Alternatively, a new
and as yet unnamed Internet-specific federal agency could be estab-
lished to regulate Internet cigar advertising. It is also important to
note congressional attempts to prohibit or limit cigar advertising and
sales on the Internet.
A. The FT C Authority to Regulate Tobacco Advertisement on the
Internet
The FTC has declared that "electronic commerce and commer-
cial activity on the Internet fall squarely within the scope of [its] statu-
tory mandate" to protect consumers. 00 In August 1998, the FTC
reiterated its goal of monitoring commercial activity on the Internet
in its manual, Advertising and Marketing on the Internet.'0 The manual
warned e-commerce businesses that the FTC's authority extends to
their online conduct.10 2 As of April 2000, the FTC brought more than
one hundred federal law enforcement actions against purveyors of
fraud on the Internet, such as credit card scams.10 3
1. Section Five Authority of the Federal Trade Commission Act
The FTC is given authority to assert jurisdiction over the online
marketplace under Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. 104 This cornerstone of federal consumer protection law provides
the FTC with broad authority to stop "deceptive" and "unfair" adver-
tisements. 105 An advertisement is "deceptive" if it contains or omits
information "likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the
circumstances," and if the offending information is "material" to the
99. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000). While,
under Brown & Williamson, the FDA was stripped of its asserted authority to regulate to-
bacco products, it would be possible for Congress to amend the FDA's mandate to include
the regulation of tobacco products, including cigars. See id. at 1303.




103. See FTC, Dot Corn Disclosures (visited May 3, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/con-
line/pubs/buspubs/dotcom/index.html>; see also, FTC v. Sabal, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009
(N.D. I11. 1998) (noting that the FTC would likely succeed on the merits of finding adver-
tisements deceptive, such as the defendant's Web site, which indicated scientific studies
proved the defendant's product would quickly and permanently improve hair growth).
104. See Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 5, 38 Stat. 717
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994)) [hereinafter Section Five].
105. See id.
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decision to buy or use the product.1 16 When advertisements target the
"elderly, children, terminally ill, or other like audience," the FTC will
adjust the reasonable consumer standard "to reflect [the] vulnerabil-
ity of that group." ' 17 Additionally, the FTC will presume that advertise-
ments that mix truths and lies mislead consumers.I10
An advertisement is "unfair" if it "causes or is likely to cause sub-
stantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by con-
sumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition."' 0 9 "Substantial consumer injury" can
include either a "relatively small harm ... inflicted upon a large num-
ber of consumers or ... a greater harm . . . inflicted on even a small
number of consumers."110 Additionally, the harm must be concrete,
such as economic harm or an unwarranted health and safety risk. 1 i
The FTC will then carry out investigations to balance the benefits and
costs of regulating a specific act or practice against taking no action at
all.1 12
2. Recent Agreements with the Seven Leading Cigar
Manufacturers, Importers, and Marketers to Require
Health Warnings
The FTC has used its Section Five authority to scrutinize the mar-
keting of tobacco products. 1 3 Most recently, in June 2000, the FTC
106. In re Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 175 n.4 (1984).
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (1994).
110. Alan N. Greenspan, Internet Advertising Laws and Regulations, 547 PLI/Pat. 325, 335
(1999).
111. See id.
112. See id. at 336.
113. The FTC ordered changes to cigarette advertisements of R.J. Reynolds when it
displayed phrases such as "no additives" on its cigarette packages and advertisements. See In
re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 992-3025, Agreement Containing Consent Order (FTC
1999), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/9923025agreement.htm>. The FTC
alleged R.J. Reynolds deceived consumers by implying through its advertising that Winston
cigarettes were less hazardous than otherwise comparable cigarettes because they con-
tained no additives. See id. at 3. R.J, Reynolds eventually consented to include warnings on
its Winston cigarette packages and advertisements, including Internet advertisements,
which indicate that additive-free cigarettes "does not mean safer" cigarettes, in exchange
for not filing the complaint. Id. at 2-3. In another case, applying its "unfair" Section Five
test in the controversial "Joe Camel" cartoon advertising campaign, the FTC alleged R.J.
Reynolds "unfairly" targeted children and adolescents through use of cartoon characters.
See In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 9285, Complaint (FTC May 28, 1997), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/1997/9705/d9285cmp.htm> [hereinafter Reynolds Complaint].
The highly effective campaign resulted in the largest proportion of Camel smokers being
under the age of 18 and increased overall market share. See id. at 1-2. In January 1999,
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used its Section Five authority to require the seven largest cigar manu-
facturers, importers, and marketers 1 4 to display health warnings on
cigar packages and advertisements.' 1 5 Draft complaints, which the
FTC used to achieve settlements, alleged that the respondent cigar
companies failed to disclose certain heath information that materially
affected consumer decisions to use cigars. 116 Additionally, the draft
complaints alleged that the respondents' failure to disclose these facts
"[has] caused or [was] likely to cause substantial and ongoing injury
to the health and safety of children and adolescents under the age of
18 that is not offset by any countervailing benefits and is not reasona-
bly avoidable by these consumers."' 17 Based on these allegations, the
draft complaints concluded that the cigar companies violated Section
Five by committing "unfair or deceptive acts or practices.""18
The Consent Orders specifically address cigar advertisements on
the Internet.' 19 Pursuant to the Orders, respondent cigar companies
must conspicuously display one of the five following health warnings
on advertisements on the Internet, subject to certain exemptions: 120
SURGEON GENERAL WARNING: Cigar Smoking Can Cause
Cancers Of The Mouth And Throat, Even If You Do Not Inhale.
after reaching a settlement, the FTC agreed to dismiss the complaint in exchange for R.J.
Reynolds's permanent discontinuation of the 'Joe Camel" campaign. See In re Reynolds
Tobacco Co., No. 9285, Order of Dismissal (FTC Jan. 26, 1999), available at <http://www.
ftc.gov/os/1999/d09285.htm>.
114. The respondents are Swisher Int'l, Inc. (No. 002-3199); Consolidated Cigar Corp.
(No. 002-3200); Havatampa, Inc. (No. 002-3204); General Cigar Holdings, Inc. (No. 002-
3202);John Middleton, Inc. (No. 002-3205); Lane Ltd. (No. 002-3203); and Swedish Match
N. Am., Inc. (No. 002-3201). An index linking to all the agreements containing the pro-
posed consent orders for each of these companies can be found at <http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2000/06/index.htm>. The proposed consent orders, which are virtually identical, are
hereinafter cited as "Consent Orders."
115. See FTC, News Release, 'YC Announces Settlements Requiring Disclosure of Cigar Health
Risks, June 26, 2000, available in 2000 WL 817312, at *1.
116. See, e.g., Reynolds Complaint, supra note 113.
117. Id. at 13.
118. Id.
119. See id. at V.
120. These seemingly detailed electronic advertising restrictions are more lax than
controls the FTC recommended in its 1999 report, under which FTC stated the overarch-
ing goal should be that the federal government regulate cigars in a manner consistent with
present regulation of other tobacco products. See FFC 1996-97 Report, supra note 26, at 2.
To that end, the FTC specifically recommended extending the ban on tobacco advertising
on any electronic medium under the FCC's jurisdiction to include cigars. See id. at 12. Not
only do the Consent Orders fail to achieve this goal, the Orders specifically allow cigar
advertising on television and radio, in retreat from its explicit statements the previous year.
See Consent Orders, supra note 114, at V. The reach of the electronic advertising ban (and
proposed expansion to include cigars) is discussed in the following section on the FCC's
jurisdiction over the Internet. See infra Part II.B.
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SURGEON GENERAL WARNING: Cigar Smoking Can Cause
Lung Cancer And Heart Disease.
SURGEON GENERAL WARNING: Tobacco Use Increases The
Risk Of Infertility, Stillbirth, And Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL WARNING: Cigars Are Not A Safe Alterna-
tive To Cigarettes.
SURGEON GENERAL WARNING: Tobacco Smoke Increases
The Risk Of Lung Cancer And Heart Disease, Even in
Nonsmokers. 121
In Internet advertising, these warnings "shall be superimposed on
the screen in black print on a white background enclosed in a black
rectangular box" in a size and for a duration sufficient to allow an
ordinary consumer to read and comprehend them. 122 Additionally,
the warnings "shall be presented in an unavoidable manner on every
Web page, online service page, or other electronic page, and shall not
be accessed or displayed through hyperlinks, pop-ups, interstitials, or
other similar means." 123 The Consent Orders do not indicate whether
warnings shall be posted on other Internet products, such as e-mails,
hyperlink banners, or listservs.
Despite detailed warning requirements, the FTC Consent Orders
fail to address other concerns surrounding the marketing of cigars on
the Internet. First, as indicated in Part I of this Article, there is a
dearth of adequate safeguards to prevent the sale of cigars to under-
age users. 124 The Consent Orders fail to even encourage the use of
age-verification technology or other techniques designed to identify a
consumer's age.
Second, although the Consent Orders purport to create a "uni-
form national system of health warnings," the scope of each Order is
limited to advertisements "made by or on behalf of [the] respon-
dent[s]."125 Thus, Internet cigar advertising paid for by anyone other
than the seven respondents need not carry health warnings. While the
121. Consent Orders, supra note 114, at I.
122. Id. at V.
123. Id. at V.
124. See discussion supra Part I.
125. Consent Orders, supra note 114, at 11. Section 5(m)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act allows the FTC to forbid certain conduct based on issuance of a final
order as long as the party is aware of the order. See Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914,
Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 5(m)(1)(B), 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(m)(1)(B) (1994)). This rule-like procedure does not apply to consent decrees. See 15
U.S.C. § 45(m) (1) (B). Thus, the scope of the marketing requirements extends only to the
respondents as defined in the Consent Orders.
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respondents supply 95% of the United States cigar market, 126 the ex-
act percentage of online cigar advertisements attributable to the re-
spondents-"made by or on behalf of" the respondents-remains
unclear.
The 1999 FTC report to Congress, examining the increase in ci-
gar advertisements on the Internet (and other media) for the years
1996 and 1997, provides a starting point to assess the reach of the
Consent Orders.1 27 After collecting marketing data from the five larg-
est domestic cigar manufacturers, the FTC found that expenditures
on Internet advertisements had risen 180% between 1996 and
1997. 128 The Consent Orders certainly would include these and subse-
quent online advertisements paid for (directly and indirectly) by the
respondents.1 29
However, the FTC cautioned that the cigar industry's actual pres-
ence on the Internet was "substantially greater" than represented by
the five leading manufacturers in the 1999 report, even though those
manufacturers supplied 90% of the market in 1996 and 1997.130 The
FTC's report indicated a substantial portion of Internet advertising
was comprised of indirect advertisers, such as online magazines and
chat rooms established by cigar organizations.1 ' Additionally, the re-
port only reflected expenditures by the leading manufacturers, and
did not include independent advertising by tobacco retailers.' 32 Given
the ease and low cost of establishing a Web site, independent retailers
probably account for a large percentage of online cigar advertise-
ments. Since the Consent Orders will not bind these members of the
cigar industry, they are then free to advertise and sell cigars without
any health warnings.1 -3"
Instead of attacking unfair or deceptive cigar advertisements
member-by-member, the FTC could establish trade regulations requir-
126. See FTC, News Release, FTC Announces Settlements Requiring Disclosure of Cigar Health
Risks, June 26, 2000, available in 2000 WL 817312, at *1.
127. See FTC 1996-97 Report, supra note 26, at 2.
128. See id. at 4.
129. See Consent Orders, supra note 114, at VII.
130. See FTC 1996-97 Report, supra note 26, at 4-5.
131. See id. at 5.
132. See id.
133. There are additional concerns about the Consent Orders. For example, they do
not feature any language that indicates they will not preempt tort claims. Nor do the Con-
sent Orders mandate regular scientific review of the effectiveness of the prescribed warn-
ings. See generally Consent Orders, supra note 114.
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ing all cigar advertisements to include warnings.' 34 Such regulations
would meet more effectively the FTC's goal of creating a "comprehen-
sive national system of simple and direct warnings," particularly on the
Internet. 135 Additionally, an industry-wide rule avoids the potential for
inconsistent health warnings voluntarily posted by members of the in-
dustry who are not bound by the Consent Orders, a contingency
which the FTC noted might confuse consumers or "undercut the sali-
ency" of warnings. 13 6
B. The FCC's Jurisdictional Reach and the Federal Ban (and
Proposed Ban) on Electronic Advertisements for
Tobacco Products
1. The Scope of the Electronic Advertising Ban and Its Proposed
Extension to Cover All Cigars
In its 1999 report, the FTC proposed an alternative to the In-
ternet warnings required by the Consent Orders, namely, that the ex-
isting ban on "advertising on any medium of electronic
communication subject to the jurisdiction of the [FCC]" of certain
tobacco products be extended to include cigars. 137 Supporting this
recommendation, the FTC analogized the current trends in cigar pro-
motion and consumption to those surrounding the history of a previ-
ous cigar advertisement ban, 3 8 the Little Cigar Act of 1973.139
Prior to the Little Cigar Act, the ban on electronic advertising,
which was enacted in 1970 and enforced on the first day of 1971, only
included cigarettes. 1 40 Exploiting the limited scope of the ban, retail-
ers and manufacturers began to advertise little cigars-a cigarette-like
cigar-on television, which resulted in a 254% jump in consumption
of little cigars from 1971 to 1972.141 In 1973, Congress responded by
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1994) (noting that the FTC may promulgate industry-wide
rules to prevent unfair and deceptive acts or practices when certain criteria are present).
135. FTC, Analysis of Proposed Consent Orders To Aid Public Comment 4 (June 2000)
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2O00/06/cigarsanalysis.htm> [hereinafter FITC Analysis].
136. Id. at 4.
137. Id. at 12.
138. See id.
139. Little Cigar Act of 1973, Pub. L No. 93-109, 87 Stat. 352 (1973) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
140. See Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970).
141. See FTC Analysis, supra note 135, at 12.
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extending the ban to include little cigars by enacting the Little Cigar
Act,1 42 leading to a steady drop in their sales. 143
The recent increases in cigar promotion and consumption indi-
cate members of the cigar industry are exploiting the same loophole
that little cigar promoters exploited in 1971 and 1972. Cigars are
heavily advertised on the Internet which, under the language of the
existing ban, is a practice from which almost all advertisers of other
tobacco products are plainly excluded. 144 As the Internet grows in
popularity, the promotion-and most likely consumption-of cigars
will increase, unless the ban is expanded to include cigars.
2. The FCC's Jurisdiction Over the Internet
Communication takes place over the Internet via telephone lines,
radio and digital frequencies, and other electronic communication
pathways under the FCC's jurisdiction. Thus, advertising certain to-
bacco products on the Internet would seem to be prohibited under
the FCC's electronic ban.1 45 The FCC's non-regulatory approach to
the Internet, however, calls into question whether the wording of the
FCC's ban-"any electronic medium under the jurisdiction of the
[FCC]"-actually includes the Internet. Through a series of regula-
tory findings, 46 information bulletins, 47 and speeches,1 48 the FCC
has maintained that it has no authority to regulate content on the
142. The ban was found not to violate the First Amendment or Due Process Clause of
the Constitution. See Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584-85 (D.D.C.
1971).
143. See CDC 1999 REPORT, supra note 2, at 12.
144. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 4402(f) (1994). Section 1335 restricts cigarette and little
cigars advertisements on media under FCC's jurisdiction, see id. § 1335, while § 4402(f)
restricts smokeless tobacco advertisements on media under FCC's jurisdiction, see id.
§ 4402(f).
145. See Greenspan, supra note 110, at 349.
146. See, e.g., 2 F.C.C.R. 3072 (1987); 3 F.C.C.R. 1150 (1988); 4 F.C.C.R. 5927 (1989).
147. See, e.g., FCC, Parents, Kids & Communications: Helping Children Benefit From Positive
Communications Tools (visited Jan. 25, 2000) <http:/www.fcc.gov/parentsinformation>
(noting that "the FCC does not have jurisdiction over the content of Internet pages nor
over the content of e-mail sent over the Internet").
148. On March 25, 1999, addressing the FCC's role in regulating the content of adver-
tising on electronic media, Susan Ness stated:
We have a continuing role to regulate the terms and conditions of certain parts of
what are commonly thought of as "telephone networks." I'd like to take this op-
portunity to answer any questions about the desire or intention of the Commis-
sion to "regulate the Internet." The answer to that question is "No." The long
answer is "Hell, no!"
Susan Ness, Remarks of FCC Commissioner Susan Ness Before the American Advertising Federation
National Governmental Affairs Conference (Mar. 25, 1999) <http://www.fcc.gov/commission-
ers/ness/spmain.htm>. On February 9, 1998, Susan Ness stated:
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Internet. To establish that the ban on electronic advertising includes
the Internet despite the FCC's hands-off policy, it is important to ex-
amine briefly its statutory mandate and some of its administrative
findings.
Against the background of the FCC's reticence to regulate the
Internet, the United States Supreme Court has found that the FCC
has broad jurisdiction over the new communication technology. In
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,149 the Supreme Court reviewed
the Communication Act of 1934150 to determine whether the FCC's
jurisdiction included cable television.' 5' At that time, cable television
was a new communication technology.152 Based on the Act's language,
its legislative history, and the historical context, the Court concluded
that the FCC had broad jurisdiction. 153 The Court found:
The Act's provisions are explicitly applicable to "all interstate and
foreign communication by wire and radio .... ." The [FCC] was
expected [by Congress] to serve as "the single Governmental
agency" with "unified jurisdiction" and "regulatory power over all
forms of electrical communication, whether by telephone, tele-
graph, cable, or radio." 154
The Court went on to find that "[n]othing in the language of
[the Act, its] history, or [its] purpose limits the Commission's author-
ity to those activities and forms of communication that are specifically
described by the [Act].' 155 Indeed, the Court recognized that Con-
gress charged the FCC with the responsibility of regulating unforeseen
electronic communication media. 56
Let me start by listing some of the things we haven't done. We haven't required
Internet service providers to pay per-minute "access charges" that are imposed on
long-distance carriers. We haven't subjected ISPs to any of the other regulatory
requirements that the Communication Act places on carriers-such as price regu-
lation or tariff filing or universal service requirements. We haven't barred provid-
ers of software for Internet telephony from selling their products. And we haven't
applied any or our rules governing content in broadcasting to the Internet.
Susan Ness, Remarks of Commissioner Susan Ness Before the Washington Web Internet Policy Forum
(Feb. 9, 1998) <http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/ness/spmain.htm>.
149. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
150. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-161 (1994).
151. See Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 167. The exact communication technologies in
question included cable transmission by wire and microwave spectrum. See id. at 163-64.
152. See Werbach, supra note 5, at 28.
153. See Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 167.
154. Id. at 167-68 (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 172.
156. See id.
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From late 1966 to 1971, in regulatory findings known as "Com-
puter I,"157 the FCC began to confront the marriage between its tradi-
tional role of regulating the wire and telecommunication industry and
the data processing services (computers). Unsure how to apply tradi-
tional common carrier regulations, the FCC decided to proceed on a
case-by-case basis, applying common carrier regulations over "com-
puter-controlled transmission of messages, between two or more
points, via communications facilities, wherein the content of the mes-
sage remains unaltered.' 58 The FCC decided, however, that other
data processing technology would remain unregulated. 159
Despite these extensive findings, the FCC found its Computer I
rules were nearly technologically obsolete even during implementa-
tion in 1973.160 Additionally, the FCC failed to define its jurisdictional
scope over computer use in this country's communication infrastruc-
ture. Three years after the implementation of the Computer I rules,
the FCC began a second round of regulatory findings, culminating in
the foundation of much of the FCC's current regulatory scheme.161
In 1980, under a report entitled "Computer Inquiry II," the FCC
asserted jurisdiction over communication services called "enhanced
services," which included the Internet. 62 Relying on the Supreme
Court's broad reading of the FCC's statutory mandate in Southwestern
Cable, the FCC concluded it had "ancillary jurisdiction" pursuant to
sections 152163 and 153164 of the Communication Act. 165 The Com-
157. See Oxman, supra note 4, at 6.
158. In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter & Communication Services & Facilities (Computer Use of Communications Facili-
ties), 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 295-96 (1971) (Final Decision and Order).
159. See id. at 296.
160. See id.; see also Computer II Final Order, supra note 98, at 391-92.
161. Susan Ness, Remarks of Commissioner Susan Ness Before the Washington Web Internet
Policy Forum (Feb. 9, 1998) <http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/ness/spmain.htm>.
162. See Computer II Final Order, supra note 98, at 431-35, 450-52. The FCC created a
new distinction between "basic" and "enhanced services." See id. at 418-19. "Basic services"
include "a pure transmission capability over a communications path that is virtually trans-
parent in terms of its interaction with customer supplied information." Id. at 420. "En-
hanced services" include any other communication service and are defined as "computer
processing applications that are used to act on the content, code, protocol, and other
similar aspects of the subscriber's information, and provide the subscriber with additional,
different, or restructured information, or involve subscriber interaction with stored infor-
mation." Id. at 420-21.
163. 47 U.S.C. § 152 (1994). Section 152 states that the FCC has jurisdiction over "all
interstate and foreign communication by wire and radios." Id.
164. Id. § 153. Section 153 defines communication by wire as "the transmission of writ-
ing, signs, signals, pictures and sounds of all kinds ... incidental to such transmission." Id.
165. See Computer II Final Order, supra note 98, at 431-35, 450-52.
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puter II findings and rules were later sustained by the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia.1 66
Given that the FCC was both deemed to have and has asserted
jurisdiction over the Internet, its authority to extend the electronic
ban to include cigars-thus prohibiting advertisement of cigars on the
Internet-must be considered. 167 The FCC has general rule-making
authority under its enabling statute of the Communication Act.'6 8 Sec-
tion 303(r) of the Act provides:
The Commission [shall] from time-to-time, as public convenience,
interest, or necessity shall require ... make such rules and regula-
tions and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsis-
tent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Act. 16
9
This statutory language seems to provide the FCC with broad au-
thority to address new forms of communication, such as the Internet,
that appear to fall within its objective to facilitate "interstate and for-
eign commerce in communication.' 170 In Southwestern Cable, the Su-
preme Court found that the FCC could have used section 303(r) to
make or amend rules to address the then-novel communication me-
dium of cable television.' 71 The FCC had initially sought legislation to
obtain authority to regulate the cable industry.' 72 After Congress
failed to respond, the FCC adopted, and the Supreme Court upheld, a
series of rules for the cable industry that were "reasonably ancillary to
the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibili-
ties."' 173 The Supreme Court's broad reading of section 303(r) sug-
gests that the Communication Act empowers the FCC with
rulemaking authority to address problems in novel electronic commu-
nication beyond what Congress initially expected. Thus, the FCC
could extend the electronic ban to include cigar advertising on the
Internet.
166. See Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 202 (D.C.
Cir. 1982). Ironically, the FCC asserted jurisdiction to ensure the Internet could develop in
a non-regulatory environment. The FCC specifically found the market for enhanced ser-
vices was "truly competitive" and as such would protect the public interest in reasonable
rates and availability of enhanced services. See id. at 207. The FCC deemed necessary the
preemption of some state regulation to insulate a non-regulatory environment for the
growth of enhanced services. See id. at 205.
167. For a discussion of congressional bills to expand the ban, see infra Part II.E.2.
168. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1994).
169. Id.
170. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
171. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
172. See id. at 164.
173. Id. at 178.
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3. Enforcement of the Ban on Electronic Advertising
The FTC has authority to enforce the ban on the advertisement
of smokeless tobacco on "any medium of electronic communication
subject to the jurisdiction of the [FCC]." 174 Under the Comprehensive
Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986,175 Congress pro-
vided that the FTC shall consider any such advertisement a violation
of Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission Act.176 Additionally,
the FTC should use its Section Five authority to enforce the ban on
electronic advertisements of cigarettes. The Federal Cigarette Label-
ing and Advertising Act 177 ("FCLAA") which includes the ban, specifi-
cally provides that no part of the Act "shall be construed to limit,
restrict, expand, or otherwise affect" the FTC's Section Five
authority. 178
Alternatively, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") has authority to
enforce a ban by either Congress or the FTC. 179 "[U]pon the applica-
tion of the Attorney General of the United States acting through the
several United States attorneys in their several districts," injunctions
may be sought "to prevent and restrain violations of [the ban]."180
The FCC has stated it will refer potential violations to the Office of
Consumer Litigation of the Civil Division of the DOJ. 1s t
If expanded to cigar advertising on the Internet, the ban would
effectively stem the increasing presence of cigar advertisements on the
Internet. Indeed, various lawmakers have proposed expanding the
ban. Several bills introduced in the 106th Congress brought cigar ad-
vertising within the scope of the ban. 18 2 Additionally, as indicated
above, the FTC proposed expanding the ban in its 1999 report to
Congress.18 3 Lastly, although it presently maintains a hands-off policy
over the Internet, in February 1969, the FCC, on its own initiative,
174. 15 U.S.C. § 4402(f) (1994).
175. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1994).
176. See id. § 4402(f).
177. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994).
178. Id. § 1336.
179. See id. § 1339; see also Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 999 F.2d 19, 21 (1st
Cir. 1993) (finding in a civil suit brought to force the FCC to apply the electronic ban to
alleged product placement that the DOJ was charged with enforcement of the ban).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 1339.
181. See FCC, The FCC and Broadcasting, at 8 (visited Apr. 25, 2000) <http://www.fcc.
gov/mmb/enf/forms/fcc 100.html>.
182. See, e.g., S. 2125, 106th Cong. (2000), discussed infra Part II.E.2.
183. But see generally Consent Orders, supra note 114.
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promulgated a rule to ban electronic advertising of cigarettes prior to
Congress's enactment of the original ban. 184
C. Regulation by the Food & Drug Administration
Theoretically, the Food and Drug Administration could be em-
powered by Congress to' regulate cigar (tobacco) advertising over the
Internet and via other media. But a recent United States Supreme
Court decision dealt a deathblow to the FDA's authority to regulate
tobacco products.' 85 After years of challenges to agency rules in-
tended to curb consumption by young people of cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco, 186 the Supreme Court, in FDA v. Brown & William-
son,t 87 invalidated the regulations, holding "Congress has clearly pre-
cluded the FDA from asserting jurisdiction to regulate tobacco
products."'18 8 Ironically, the majority in Brown & Williamson reasoned
that Congress did not intend for the FDA to regulate tobacco prod-
ucts; otherwise, it would be required to remove tobacco products from
the market since the FDA has concluded that tobacco products are
not safe for any use.' 8 9
Thus, unlike the FTC and FCC, which arguably have some ex-
isting authority to regulate cigar advertising over the Internet, the
FDA is currently devoid of any such power. It is quite possible that
Congress will respond to the Supreme Court's ruling by adopting, or
at least considering, legislation carving out a role for the FDA to regu-
late tobacco products.' 90 Shortly before the Brown & Williamson deci-
184. See FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 34 Fed. Reg. 1959 (1969). A few months
later, on July 22, 1969, the Senate Commerce Committee commenced hearings, interven-
ing to stop both the FCC and FTC's proposed marketing restrictions on the cigarette in-
dustry. See Graham Kelder, Fight for the Future Or Everything You Always Wanted to Know About
How the Tobacco Industry (a.k.a. The Cigarette Smoking Men) Killed the McCain Bill But .Were
Afraid to Ask, Tobacco Control Update, Vol. 2, Issues 3 & 4, 67 (1998) .
185. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1315-16 (2000)
(holding that the FDA lacks authority to regulate normal marketing of tobacco products).
186. Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco, 21 C.F.R. § 897 (1999). The regulations would
have strengthened age-verification requirements; established new limits on youth access
(for example, limits on vending machines, self-service displays, and a ban on free sam-
pling); and restricted certain forms of tobacco advertising and promotion, including, inter
alia, outdoor advertising, promotional items, sponsorships, and print advertising in youth-
oriented publications. See id.
187. 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
188. Id. at 1297.
189. The Court was nearly evenly divided in its opinion, with five justices joining the
majority decision to strike the regulations based on this interpretation of the FDA's author-
ity and four justices dissenting. See id. at 1303.
190. A number of bills granting the FDA express authority to regulate tobacco prod-
ucts were filed in both the House and Senate shortly after the Supreme Court invalidated
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sion was issued, at least one cigarette maker announced that it might
be ready to accept some form of FDA product regulation.1 9' However,
it is unclear how much FDA regulation the industry would be willing
to accept, especially now that it has won a Supreme Court challenge to
the FDA's regulations of tobacco sales and advertising.
Furthermore, the history of federal tobacco legislation suggests
any tobacco legislation that is deemed acceptable by the industry will
likely be designed to protect it from lawsuits.1 92 The industry may be
particularly unlikely to make any advertising concessions, given that it
can argue it already did so when it settled the lawsuits brought by the
states' attorneys general.19 3
Finally, the FDA's authority to regulate, challenged in Brown &
Williamson, did not include restrictions on cigars or Internet advertis-
ing. Neither of those areas is likely to be part of new legislation, unless
public health and tobacco-control advocates press for inclusion of
such regulations. The cigar industry would surely oppose any such
proposals. In 1997, when the cigar industry feared being swept into
the relatively comprehensive tobacco control legislation before Con-
gress, the President of the Cigar Association testified before a Con-
the FDA regulations. See, e.g., The FDA Tobacco Authority Amendments Act, H.R. 4207,
106th Cong. (2000); The Child Tobacco Use Prevention Act of 2000, H.R. 4041, 106th
Cong. (2000); The Tobacco Regulatory Fairness Act of 2000, S. 2333, 106th Cong. (2000).
Most of the bills would grant the FDA authority to regulate a wide range of tobacco prod-
ucts, including cigars. See, e.g., S. 2333, 106th Cong. § 3 (2000); H.R. 4041, 106th Cong.
§ 102(c) (2000); H.R. 4207, 106th Cong. § 3(c) (2000). However, the bills vary in the scope
of authority granted to the FDA; and thus, in potential to grant the FDA power to regulate
the sale or advertising of cigars over the Internet. House Bill 4207 clarifies that the FDA's
authority to restrict sales and distributions of tobacco includes restrictions on advertising
and promotion, making Internet restrictions at least theoretically possible. See H.R. 4207,
106th Cong. § 4(b) (3) (A) (2000). House Bill 4041 would go further by authorizing restric-
tions on advertising and promotion, see H.R. 4041, 106th Cong. § 102 (2000), validating
the FDA regulations recently struck down by the United States Supreme Court, see id.
§ 104, and requiring the Secretary to add the marketing access and advertising restrictions
set forth in Titles IA and IC of the 1997 proposed global settlement, except if such inclu-
sion would violate the First Amendment, see id. § 105. This last provision would include the
Internet advertising ban contemplated by the 1997 global settlement. See discussion infra
Part II.E.1. On the other hand, Senate Bill 2333 appears to vest authority to regulate adver-
tising of tobacco products with the FTC. See S. 2333, 106th Cong. § 1005(a) (2000); see also
id. § 1000(b) (granting the FDA authority to regulate the manufacture, distribution, and
sale of tobacco products but does not expressly include advertising).
191. SeeJohn Schwartz & Marc Kaufman, Tobacco Giant Backs IDA Role: Phillip Morris
Shifts Stand on Marketing, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 2000, at Al.
192. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994). For a discussion of the demise of the McCain bill
after industry immunity protections were watered dowh, see infra Part I1.E.1.
193. While the advertising restrictions contained in the Master Settlement Agreement
were greeted with much fanfare, they are far more modest than those on the table in 1997,
when the industry agreed to the 1997 proposed national settlement.
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gressional Committee against federal cigar regulation. 19 4 He relied
heavily on the FDA "decision" in 1995 to leave cigars and pipe tobacco
out of its regulatory scheme, asserting, in part, that the FDA chose not
to regulate cigars and pipe tobacco "because it found no credible evi-
dence that children and adolescents use these products to any signifi-
cant degree. 1 9 5
Data revealing high rates of underage cigar smoking emerged in
1997, after the 1995 FDA declaration of jurisdiction over cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco.196 If this data had been available to the agency
in 1995, it is likely the FDA might have decided to include cigars in its
youth sales and advertising restrictions. 197 However, since the FDA
currently lacks authority to regulate tobacco products and the pend-
ing legislation appears unlikely to move forward in the near future,
the FDA is probably not the best choice for regulating cigar advertis-
ing currently on the Internet.
D. New Internet Federal Agency
None of the existing federal agencies discussed in the preceding
sections possess any particular expertise about the Internet or e-com-
merce. Although extending the existing electronic ban on tobacco ad-
vertising to cover all cigars may be the most efficient option, the
creation of a new federal "Internet agency" is another alternative for
regulating cigar advertising and promotion in the rapidly changing
Internet environment.
At least one First Amendment scholar suggests creating a new fed-
eral agency charged with regulating the Internet in the wake of
Reno.' 98 The scholar reasons that the changing nature of Internet
technology and the lack of a clear judicial standard for restricting In-
194. See Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection Subcomm. of the House Commerce
Comm., 105th Cong. 40 (1998) (statement of Norman F. Sharp, on behalf of the Cigar
Ass'n of America, Inc. and the Pipe Tobacco Council, Inc.).
195. Id.
196. See discussion of youth cigar use, supra Part I.E.
197. The FDA would also have needed evidence that cigars are drug delivery devices, a
requirement that might arguably be met today based on new data regarding the health
effects and nicotine contents of cigars. See NATIONAL CANCER INST. MONOGRAPH, supra note
1, at n.1.
198. See Praveen Goyal, Congress Fumbles with the Internet: Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997), 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 637, 654 (1998).
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ternet speech make it unlikely that either the courts or Congress' 99
will regulate this new media effectively. 200
A more promising model would be a regulatory model similar to
the one in [FCC v.] Pacifica. There, an "expert agency" was respon-
sible for the determination of when a particular indecent content
could be broadcast. In Pacifica, the Court took a watchdog posture
over the agency (rather than over Congress), to ensure that the
speech-cost of agency regulations did not become too great. In the
Internet context, such an expert agency would be less likely than
Congress to draw inapt analogies to vastly different regulatory me-
dia or to irrelevant constitutional standards.
20 1
Such a suggestion will surely inspire opposition, particularly
among those who regard the unregulated nature of the Internet as
one of its most precious attributes. Nonetheless, even Professor Law-
rence Lessig, one of the most expert of such commentators-who has
expressed serious misgivings about Internet government regulation-
has conceded that a zoning-type regulation is neither impossible nor
unlikely.20 2 Professor Lessig notably discusses the present technologi-
cal barriers to identifying and screening Internet users, and other dis-
tinctions between the boundaries of communication in physical space
and cyberspace.2 0 3 Lessig eloquently describes the genesis of cyber-
space and its configuration in 1996 as it applies to the potential of
zoning cyberspace as a means of restricting advertisements of tobacco
products to areas not frequented by children.20 4 However, while Les-
199. Goyal's prediction that Congress could continue to fumble with the First Amend-
ment in its legitimate attempts to protect minors from harmful material on the Internet
appears to be correct. See id. at 654; see also ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking
down the Child Online Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (codi-
fied as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (Supp. 1998)), which the Court termed "Congress's
second attempt to regulate dissemination to minors of indecent material on the Web/
Internet").
200. See Goyal, supra note 198, at 654.
201. Id. (citing FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)).
202. See Lawrence Lessig, Legal Issues in Cyberspace: Hazards on the Information Highway:
Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869, 889 (1996) (exploring many of the
complex legal, philosophical, and technological issues related to the Internet and the First
Amendment).
203. See generally id.
204. Lessig stated:
I have belabored this commonplace about real-space zoning because it is central
to understanding a crucial difference between real space and cyberspace, as it is
now. For in the most general sense, zoning is not the architecture of cyberspace.
Indeed, zoning is just what cyberspace is, or at least was, against .... [I] t is just
this feature of cyberspace that cybersmut fanatics are so concerned about.
Id. at 887-88.
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sig clearly values the currently borderless world of cyberspace, he as-
serts that this feature is not immutable or uncontrollable, stating:
If c[yber]-world is now, orjust was, unzoned, there is nothing in its
nature that says it must forever remain so. Cyberspace has no per-
manent nature, save the nature of a place of unlimited plasticity.
We don't find cyberspace, we build it .... And how we build it
depends first upon the kind of place we want to make.20 5
There is a need for regulation to block the unfettered access chil-
dren and adolescents have to cigar (and other tobacco) advertising
and promotional and sales information on the Internet. If policy-mak-
ers choose to limit Internet access to cigar promotion, the govern-
ment has a potentially important role in establishing, monitoring, and
enforcing limits. As Lessig noted, referring to private efforts to zone
cyberspace, in 1996, cyberspace was changing "from a relatively un-
zoned place to a universe that is extraordinarily well zoned" without
any government issued mandate. 20 6 "The point is the trend: zoning is
coming to cyberspace, with an efficiency unmatched in real space."20 7
Lessig, however, apparently does not view private and govern-
ment efforts as mutually exclusive or inherently contradictory. For ex-
ample, he juxtaposes the failed Communications Decency Act of
1996208 ("CDA") and a "White Paper"20 9 calling for privatization of
copyright: "Both [the CDA and the White Paper] represent not a con-
flict between 'the Net' and the government, but a union between the
government and commercial interests on the Net, against the interests
of the Net as more traditionally understood. ' 210 Lessig further sug-
205. Id. at 888.
206. Id. at 888-89.
207. Id. at 889.
208. Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996).
209. INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL IN-
FORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]. For a description of the
WHITE PAPER, see Lessig, supra note 202, at 889 n.62.
210. Lessig, supra note 202, at 892-93. Lessig explains his views further:
The divide is not between regulation and no regulation, the divide is between a
Net where regulation as zoning is facilitated and a Net where it is not. The ques-
tion this should raise is not the narrow question of smut on the Net, but the
broader question of whether government has this power to domesticate the Net.
The question we should be asking is not whether the First Amendment bars this
one dimension of zoning; the real question should be whether cyberspace should
be free of these zonings of real space.
Id. at 893.
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gests technological fixes, which would make it both physically and
constitutionally possible to zone cyberspace. 2 11
Questions about the technological options for zoning cyber-
space-or other technologies to block access to adult sites by minors,
including but not limited to cigar Web sites-would be best consid-
ered by an administrative agency with the capacity to consider relevant
factors and to change rules relatively quickly in the constantly evolving
Internet environment. For those reasons, the Internet presents
lawmakers with the classic situation, where responses can be proactive,
with which regulatory agencies-as opposed to legislatures or
courts-are best suited to deal. 21 2 Indeed, in striking down provisions
of the CDA that limited Internet content and distinguishing it from
FCC v. Pacifica,213 the United States Supreme Court noted, inter alia,
that the statute's "broad categorical prohibitions are not limited to
particular times and are not dependent on any evaluation by an agency fa-
miliar with the unique characteristics of the Internet."214
Developing and enforcing sound regulations for the Internet will
require the active participation of 'experts in the Internet business as
well as the industries affected by Internet regulation, such as the cigar
industry. A government agency with Internet technical expertise
might be the best candidate to develop and enforce youth access re-
strictions online;215 such an agency would also be able to fine-tune the
scope of the regulated community. For example, any business or indi-
vidual who economically benefits from cigar promotion on the In-
ternet (manufacturers, retailers, wholesalers, advertisers, and
potentially even dues-paying associations of cigar smokers) should be
211. See id. at 892-94. Among such fixes Lessig proposed a chip, analogous to the V-
chip for television, which distinguishes content as a means to zone the Internet. See id.
"And while the constitutional question here will be quite complex, at least to the extent
that such a system is seen as a 'truth in labeling' law, I don't believe it will raise any substan-
tial constitutional concerns." Id. at 894.
212. Courts have shown a growing willingness to defer decisions on policy matters and
statutory interpretation to administrative agencies. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Na-
tional Resources Defense Counsel, 467 U.S. 837, 864-66 (1984); see also Susan K. Golpen,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies' Legal Interpretations after Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,
68 WASH. L. REv. 207, 207 (1993) (explaining there are. three principle reasons for the
prevalence of such judicial deference: agency expertise, agency flexibility, and political
accountability).
213. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
214. ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 867 (1997) (emphasis added).
215. Its charge may not be limited to restricting cigar (tobacco) advertising.
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covered by regulations designed to block minors' access to cigar sales,
advertising, or promotion sites. 216
However, given the vast, uncharted territory an Internet agency
would face, the creation of a new federal agency-even one simply
charged with applying existing laws to and designing new laws for the
Internet-might not be an ideal solution. Considering both the time
and political will necessary to establish such an agency, as well as the
many competing demands with which the agency would likely be
charged, this approach will not likely be a speedy solution to regulat-
ing cigar advertising on the Internet.
E. Recent Federal Legislative Activity
1. 1997 Proposed National Tobacco Settlement Bills
Several bills have recently been introduced into Congress seeking
to limit or even prohibit the advertisement and sale of tobacco prod-
ucts on the Internet. A total ban on Internet advertising of tobacco
products21 7 was featured in the 1997 proposed national settlement of
the lawsuits brought by the states' attorneys general against the to-
bacco industry.2 18 Congress ultimately rejected the settlement, propos-
ing numerous changes to federal law and granting the tobacco
industry immunity, primarily because the industry withdrew its sup-
port and instead actively campaigned against federal legislation. 219
Later, in November 1998, the states reached an industry-led settle-
ment which was a significantly scaled down version of the 1997 pro-
posed settlement, and failed altogether to address Internet
advertising. 220 Although the 1997 proposed settlement and various
legislative attempts to implement it were ultimately defeated, a brief
discussion of the approaches to establishing a ban on Internet tobacco
advertisements is instructive.
216. While we would leave the details to the administrative agency, our proposed regu-
latory scheme would not reach adults who sell cigars over the Internet exclusively to adults
or who discuss their use or enjoyment of cigars with other adults online.
217. This section of the proposed settlement did not define the term "tobacco prod-
ucts." However, it is unlikely that the drafter intended to include cigars, which were not
part of the litigation underlying the settlement. See discussion of the bills purporting to
implement the 1997 proposed settlement, supra note 190.
218. See Proposed Resolution (June 20, 1997) at 8, available at <http://www.cnn.com/
US/9705/tobacco/docs/proposal.html> [hereinafter Proposed Resolution].
219. See Kelder, supra note 184, at 7 (describing $40 million campaign waged to destroy
settlement bills).
220. See generally Master Settlement Agreement (Nov. 23, 1998) <http://naag.org/
tobac/cigmsa.rtf>.
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On November 7, 1997, several months after the proposed na-
tional settlement was announced, Senator John McCain introduced
Senate Bill 1415.221 McCain's bill "sought, in part, to embody many
aspects of the proposed national settlement [of smoking-related law-
suits] in the form of the [c]ongressional legislation necessary to give it
the force of law." 222 Although failing to encompass most cigar prod-
UCts, 2 2 3 the activity surrounding Senate Bill 1415 evinced a serious
congressional effort to ban tobacco-related advertisements on the
Internet.
Senate Bill 1415 would have forced the tobacco industry to adver-
tise on Web sites that are inaccessible to minors. In exchange for im-
munity from certain suits, Senate Bill 1415 also required members of
the tobacco industry who were parties to the settlement to enter into a
marketing protocol, providing specific rules and directions for accept-
able forms of promotion and sale of tobacco products.2 24 The proto-
col provided, in part:
No tobacco product [of a member of the protocol] will be sold or
distributed in the United States unless advertising . . .do[es] not
appear on the international computer network of both federal and
non-federal interoperable packet switches data networks (the "In-
ternet"), unless such advertising is designed to be inaccessible in or
from the United States to all individuals under the age of 18
years. 225
Other 1997 national settlement legislation contained similar bans on
Internet advertisements as part of their protocols. 226
221. S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997).
222. Kelder, supra note 184, at 5.
223. See S. 1415, 105th Cong. § 6(7) (1997) (defining tobacco products subject to regu-
lation under the bill as "cigarettes, cigarette tobacco, smokeless tobacco, little cigars, roll-
your-own tobacco, and fine cut").
224. See id. § 1401 (a).
225. Id. § 1404(a)(1)(F).
226. See S. 1530, 105th Cong. §§ 201(a), 212(c) (1997) (providing to be eligible to
enjoy protection from liability from suit, participating manufacturers must enter into a
protocol with the United States Attorney General, the governor of each state, and others,
which, in part, shall state "[n]o manufacturer, distributor, or retailer may use the Internet
to advertise tobacco products unless such advertisement is inaccessible in or from the
United States"); see also S. 1638, 105th Cong. §§ 721, 726 (1998) (mandating eligibility for
suit protection is contingent upon entering into a contract with United States Attorney
General, state attorneys general, the FTC, and other relevant parties regarding advertising
protocol, which must include a complete ban on Internet advertisements accessible in or
from the United States); id. at §§ 721(a), 726(c) (requiring manufacturers to enter into
protocol, which, in part, bars advertising on the Internet that is accessible in or from the
United States, in order to receive protection from some suits); S. 1414, 105th Cong.
§§ 101(c), 156(a) (1) (1997) (mandating ban on Internet advertising, which the Secretary
of Health and Human Services may assess penalties for non-compliance).
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With access to the lucrative United States market as a reward, the
protocol would have been a catalyst for developing reliable age-verifi-
cation technology for almost all e-tobacconists. Furthermore, because
geographic location does not restrict data traveling the Internet, other
countries would have benefited from the effects of the protocol, inas-
much as foreign e-tobacconists and manufacturers who also wanted to
sell in the United States.2 27 Under this clause of the protocol, manu-
facturers or importers would have had two options to maintain their
access to the United States market. First, they could have developed
reliable age-verification technology and required any person selling
their product on the Internet to use this technology. Second, they
could have prohibited any retailer from advertising on the Internet,
an option few manufacturers or importers were likely to have
supported.
The apparent willingness of the tobacco industry to submit to a
ban on Internet advertising, by entering into the Proposed Resolution
and tolerating potential enactment of comprehensive federal legisla-
tion, may not have been entirely based on a desire for protection from
lawsuits. Questions arose during the debate on the merits of the pro-
posed 1997 settlement about whether the tobacco industry and other
interested parties, including Internet vendors, could subsequently ob-
ject to marketing restrictions contained in the protocols on First
Amendment grounds.2 28 Some members of Congress apparently felt
that by obtaining the consent of certain members of the tobacco in-
dustry to adhere the protocol, the legislation's marketing restraints
would go unchallenged under the First Amendment.2 29
This belief was and remains flawed for at least two reasons. First,
even after consenting, the tobacco industry could subsequently attack
the protocol under the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine.2 0 The
227. The majority of the bills empowered various protocol members to enforce bans
on Internet advertising. Senate Bill 1530, introduced by Senator Hatch, authorized the
Attorney General of the United States, see S. 1530, 105th Cong. § 231 (a) (1997), state attor-
neys general after serving notice to the United States Attorney General and waiting a cer-
tain period, see id. § 232, and even participating manufacturers, see id. § 233, to enforce the
protocol. Senate Bill 1638, introduced by Senator Conrad, allowed any person to enforce
the protocol, regardless of membership in the protocol. See S. 1638, 105th Cong. § 733(b)
(1998).
228. See Raising Tobacco Prices: New Opportunities for the Black Market? Hearings Before the
Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 161 (1998) (statement of David C. Vladeck, Dir. of
Public Citizens Litigation Group) [hereinafter 1997 Global Settlement Hearings].
229. See id. at 171.
230. See id. at 171-72. The unconstitutional doctrine posits that agreements to submit
to unconstitutional restraints may not be premised on certain conditions. See Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958). This doctrine has been called into question. See, e.g.,
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second and more important flaw stems from the limited breadth of
the protocol as a consent decree. It is well settled law that any inter-
ested party may collaterally attack the constitutionality of a consent
decree. 23 1 Thus, Internet vendors and the like could have attacked the
protocol's marketing restrictions under the First Amendment even if
other members of the industry, such as manufacturers, accepted the
agreement.23 2
Even assuming the protocol mechanism was selected to avoid or
mitigate First Amendment concerns, it also had enforcement limits.
Senate Bill 1415, as well as the other 1997 national settlement bills,
only extended to signatories to the protocol.233 Manufacturers of to-
bacco products who were not members of the marketing protocols-
most notably cigar manufacturers-could have continued to advertise
their products on the Internet.
Despite the limited breadth of the marketing protocols contained
in the 1997 settlement legislation, a future Congress would be well
served by using the preconditioning requirement, limiting Internet
advertisements that sell products in United States markets. Precondi-
tion language transfers the enforcement responsibility to the party
who has the greatest financial stake in placing tobacco products into
United States commerce. If a future Congress applied precondition
language to all cigar products, such action would quickly stem the
flood of online cigar advertisements until proper age-verification tech-
nology could be developed.
2. Senate Bill 2125 and Related Federal Bills of the 106th
Congress
Several cigar control bills were introduced to Congress in the
wake of the 1999 FTC report on cigar sales and consumption. 23 4 The
bills reveal insights regarding how Congress may act in the future to
regulate cigar advertisements and sales over the Internet.
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (denying claim that Government coerces agreement
by offering benefit that can be accepted or declined).
231. See 1997 Global Settlement Hearings, supra note 228, at 171 (citing Martin v. Wilks,
490 U.S. 755 (1989)).
232. See id.
233. See S. 1415, 105th Cong. § 1401 (1997).
234. See, e.g., S. 2125, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 2579, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2914,
106th Cong. (1999); S. 1421, 106th Cong. (1999).
Fall 2000)
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
Senate Bill 2125,235 which is intended to replace the Federal Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act 236 and the Comprehensive Smoke-
less Tobacco Health Education Act,2 37 contains the most extensive
warning requirements of all cigar control bills. 23 11 Senate Bill 2125 pro-
vides: "It shall be unlawful for any manufacturer, packager, importer,
distributor, or retailer of ... cigar[s] . . . to advertise or cause to be
advertised within the United States any such product unless its adver-
tising bears" the prescribed warnings. 239 In accordance with strict
formatting requirements, the warnings are mandatory on almost every
conceivable cigar advertisement, including "all... written ... material
used for promoting the sale or consumption of tobacco products to
consumers, and advertising at an Internet site."24°1
The phrase "advertising at an Internet site" is not defined, which
leaves open the question of whether one could sell cigars through a
Web site without being subject to the bill's advertising requirements.
Furthermore, Senate Bill 2125 expands the present FCC ban on to-
bacco product advertisement "on any medium of electronic communi-
cations subject to the jurisdiction of the [FCC]" to include cigar
advertisements. 24' Based on the FCC's broad jurisdiction over the In-
ternet, such a ban would exclude any cigar advertisements on the In-
ternet. These contradictory provisions suggest that either Senate Bill
2125 is intended to limit the FCC's jurisdiction over the Internet-a
bold move in light of the FCC's statutory mandate-or to draw a dis-
tinction between advertising and selling cigars on the Internet.
Senate Bill 2125 also provides the most extensive enforcement
mechanisms of the cigar control bills. The bill grants authority to non-
profit organizations that specialize in tobacco control "to sue any man-
ufacturer, packager, importer, distributor, or retailer of ... cigars to
enforce compliance. ' 242 If the nonprofit organization "substantially
prevails," it may recover reasonable attorney fees at the discretion of
the court.243 Alternatively, Senate Bill 2125 directs the Secretary of
235. S. 2125, 106th Cong. (2000).
236. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994).
237. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1994).
238. See S. 2125 § 4(a), 106th Cong. (2000).
239. Id. § 4(a)-(b). The warnings state: "WARNING: Cigar smoke causes mouth can-
cer. WARNING: Cigar smoke causes throat cancer. WARNING: Cigar smoke causes lung
cancer. WARNING: Cigars are not a safe alternative to cigarettes. WARNING: Cigar smoke
can harm your children." Id. § 4(a) (1)(B).
240. Id. § 2(1).
241. Id. § 4(d).
242. Id. § 7(b)(2).
243. See id. § 7(b)(I).
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Human Health and Services to monitor compliance and recommend
enforcement actions to the Attorney General when necessary. 244 Civil
penalties, of up to $100,000 per day, are available, but only the Attor-
ney General may enforce this sanction. 245
Senate Bill 1421246 and House Bill 2579,247 also introduced in the
106th Congressional Session, impose the greatest restriction on In-
ternet advertising and sales of cigars. Both bills would prohibit the
advertisement of cigars on "any medium of electronic communica-
tions subject to the jurisdiction of the [FCC]."248 Additionally, both
bills provide that "a cigar retailer may sell cigars to the ultimate con-
sumer only in a direct, face-to-face exchange."2 49 These bills suggest
that at least some members of Congress equate Internet sales of cigars
with vending machines and self-service displays, which are notorious
for the distribution of cigarettes to underage smokers. 250 The lack of
adequate age-verification technology described in Part I supports this
belief.
The federal government, while best equipped to confront the In-
ternet media campaign launched by the cigar industry, has been vul-
nerable to the tobacco industry lobby.251 Past efforts by the FTC and
FCC to pass tobacco control rules have been thwarted by this lobby.2 52
Based on the strength of the tobacco lobby at the federal level, citi-
zens can turn to state lawmakers to protect children from cigar (and
other tobacco product) advertising on the Internet, but not without
serious constitutional roadblocks.
III. State Restrictions on Internet Cigar Advertising
In the absence of federal regulation of Internet cigar advertise-
ments and sales, states might consider imposing their own restrictions.
Some of the Internet's unique features suggest state and local regula-
tions of such advertisements might be particularly vulnerable to legal
244. See id. § 7(a)(3)-(4).
245. See id. § 7(c).
246. S. 1421, 106th Cong. (1999).
247. H.R. 2579, 106th Cong. (1999).
248. S. 1421 § 3(b)(2); H.R. 2579 § 3(c)(2).
249. S. 1421 § 3(a)(3); H.R. 2579 § 3(a)(3).
250. See S. 1421 § 3(a)(3); H.R. 2579 § 3(a)(3).
251. See Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard Daynard, Sin Under Siege: The Legal Attack on
Firearms, Tobacco & Gambling, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 63, 66-68 (1997) (identifying myriad
examples of tobacco industry influence over the debate and passage of federal legislation
and action by federal agencies).
252. See id.
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challenge under the Commerce Clause.253 State regulation of Internet
sales, however, appears to avoid many of the Commerce Clause con-
cerns that plague state advertising restrictions. 254
Part A of this section considers a state's ability to regulate adver-
tising on the Internet, concluding that the Commerce Clause has, and
likely will, prohibit any attempt to do so. A recent First Circuit Court
of Appeals decision 255 illustrates how courts might view state and local
attempts to restrict Internet tobacco advertising. That decision invali-
dated state cigar warning regulations, in part, because the court con-
cluded that the warnings were required to appear on Internet
advertisements. Part B of this section briefly examines the viability of
state regulation of Internet cigar sales. Finally, this section concludes
that courts would likely uphold the extension of the traditional role of
a state in regulating the distribution of tobacco products to include
cigar (and other tobacco product) sales over the Internet. Addition-
ally, any state's role in regulating tobacco sales on the Internet merits
further analysis.
A. Commerce Clause Limits on State Regulation of the Internet
1. Commerce Clause Tests
The Federal Government's authority "to regulate Commerce ...
among the several States"' 25 6 under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution casts a broad shadow under which individ-
ual states may not tread.2 57 Nevertheless, the Commerce Clause allows
some leeway for states to protect their citizenry through consumer
protection laws.258 The Supreme Court has developed three tests to
review Commerce Clause challenges to state regulation.
The first test addresses state legislation that facially discriminates
against interstate commerce, or legislation motivated by a discrimina-
tory purpose.259 In such cases, courts will strictly scrutinize the law,26)
253. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
254. First Amendment concerns, which would also arise through state or local regula-
tion, are addressed infra Part IV.
255. See Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2000).
256. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
257. See Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 290 (1921) (noting the
Commerce Clause impliedly prohibits state regulation of interstate activity, which often
includes activity not directly related to the movement of commercial goods among states).
258. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1960) (noting
the Commerce Clause was not intended to prohibit states from regulating in areas relating
to "the health, life, and safety of their citizens" even though such regulations may affect
interstate commerce).
259. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628-29 (1978).
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usually invalidating the law as a per se violation of the Commerce
Clause.26' To determine whether to apply the per se rule under the
so-called Pike test,262 courts initially ask whether the state law is "basi-
cally [an economic] protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be
viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon
interstate commerce that are only incidental. ' 263.
The second Commerce Clause test is applied when a state law
"regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public inter-
est, and its effects on inter-state commerce are only incidental."26 4 In
such cases, the state law "will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits."2 65 This comparison is not static. "[T]he extent of the bur-
den that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities." 266
The third Commerce Clause test, developed in Southern Pacific Co.
v. Arizona26 7 and rarely invoked, 268 seeks to identify "phases of the na-
tional commerce which, because of the need of national uniformity,
demand that their regulation, if any, be prescribed by a single author-
ity." 269 This test only applies "when a lack of national uniformity
would impede the flow of interstate goods." 270 The test focuses more
on the type of commerce rather than on the particular state law. Even
260. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (noting that the "strictest scru-
tiny" shall apply to review discriminatory state laws).
261. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
262. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
263. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. The United States Supreme Court identified
protectionist measures as laws that "discriminat[e] against articles of commerce coming
from outside the State" which are no different from articles in-state except for their origin.
Id. at 626-27. There is a narrow exception to the per se rule. The Supreme Court has
allowed protectionist laws to stand based on the "noxious" character of an article in com-
merce. See id. at 628-29. An article of commerce is noxious if "[its] very movement endan-
gers health." Id. at 629.
264. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. The Supreme Court has chosen not to draw a clear distinc-
tion between when this test applies, and when the stricter per se rule applies. See Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986).
265. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
266. Id.
267. 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945).
268. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 128 (1978) (finding that
"rarely" does the Commerce Clause preempt an entire field from state regulation).
269. Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 767.
270. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 128. The Supreme Court has used this test to strike down a state
law regarding the amount of cars in a train, see Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 761, and the
contours of mudguards on trucks, see Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520
(1959).
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if one type of commerce is arguably more deserving of a national reg-
ulatory scheme, state laws that vary little from a national trend can
withstand Commerce Clause review under this test because national
uniformity substantially exists.271
In one of the first applications of dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine to the Internet, a federal district court found that a New York
state law criminalizing the use of a computer to disseminate obscene
material to minors failed all three Commerce Clause tests, in American
Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki.272 First, the court held that the per se rule
applied because New York's regulation of the Internet directly inter-
fered with interstate commerce, despite the dearth of any economic
protectionism in the legislative means or end.2 73 In what is best de-
scribed as a broad reading of the per se rule, the court found that
New York directly imposed its domestic policies on other states based
on the extra-territorial nature of the Internet.274
In applying the second test, the district court said that "the bur-
dens [New York's law] impose [d] on interstate commerce are exces-
sive in relation to the local benefits it confers." 275 The court found
that New York's law "chilled" art and commerce on the Internet be-
cause users might be afraid of prosecution and because the costs of
compliance were excessive. 276 Furthermore, the district court held
that the local benefits were not "overwhelming" because nearly half
the Internet communications originate from outside the United
States, and because New York would have difficulty enforcing the
law.
2 7 7
271. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 436-37 (S.D. Ohio
1980) (citing Exxon, 437 U.S. at 128-29).
272. 969 F. Supp. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). One year later, the Federal District Court
of New Mexico addressed a challenge to a similar state law. SeeACLU v.Johnson, 4 F. Supp.
2d 1029 (D.N.M. 1998). The court enjoined enforcement of a state law, following, inter
alia, the same analysis employed in American Libraries. See id. at 1033.
273. See American Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at 173. The court arguably overextended appli-
cation of the per se rule in this case. The New York law had no preference for in-state
Internet users either in the law's legislative means or ends. See id. at 171. Moreover, the law
had no economic underpinnings. See id. at 172. To apply jurisprudence which is tradition-
ally based on economic protectionism is questionable.
274. See id. at 174-75. The court relied on Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641-43
(1982), in which a plurality applied the per se rule and the Pike test to find Illinois violated
the Commerce Clause. See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 640. The state law in question regulated
tender offers for securities of a corporation in which Illinois citizens had some vested inter-
est, a distinctly economic article of commerce. See id. at 642.
275. American Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at 177.
276. See id. at 179-80.
277. See id. at 178-79.
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Finally, the court in American Libraries invalidated New York's law
based on the third Commerce Clause test developed in Southern Pa-
cific.2 7 8 The district court viewed the Internet as analogous to national
railway and highway infrastructures, and thus reasoned it warranted a
"cohesive national scheme of regulation. '" 270 The court went on to
find that "even were all 50 states to enact laws that were verbatim cop-
ies of the New York Act, Internet users would still be subject to discor-
dant responsibilities" based on the lack of a clear definition of
"obscene" and other similar terms likely to be employed in such
laws.
2 8 0
However, in at least one instance, the application of state con-
sumer protection laws to the Internet survived a Commerce Clause
legal challenge. 281 Upholding charges of fraud brought against a local
Internet user, a New York state court, in New York v. Lipsitz, 28 2 noted
that, despite the national nature of the Internet, the state consumer
law was "not . . . aimed at regulating conduct outside [the state's]
borders," because the law only targeted users who posted Internet ma-
terial while in the state of New York.2 83
2. Internet Cigar Advertising Regulations in Massachusetts
In Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Reilly,284 the First Circuit Court of
Appeals recently considered the constitutionality of regulation of ci-
gar advertising on the Internet, in a case challenging a series of to-
bacco regulations promulgated by the Attorney General for the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 285 At trial, the district court was
asked to rule, inter alia, on the validity of state-based cigar warning
requirements on cigar advertising. 28 6
278. See id. at 177.
279. Id. at 182.
280. Id.
281. See People v. Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d 468, 475 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
282. 663 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
283. Id. at 475. At least one commentator has also observed that state consumer protec-
tion laws have not been viewed as triggering dormant Commerce Clause problems. See
Bruce Keller, The Game's the Same: Why Gambling in Cyberspace Violates Federal Law, 579 PLI/
Pat 227, 255 (Nov.-Dec. 1999).
284. 218 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2000), affg in part and rev'g in part, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 84 F. Supp. 2d 180 (D. Mass. 2000).
285. See Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 182.
286. See id. at 183. The relevant portion of the regulations provided: "It shall be an
unfair or deceptive act or practice for any person to advertise or cause to be advertised
within Massachusetts any cigar or little cigar unless the advertising bears one of the warn-
ing statements... rotated in accordance with" these regulations. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 940,
§ 22.05(1) (2000). The regulations broadly defined advertising as "any oral, written,
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In the underlying case of Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,28 7 the dis-
trict court focused primarily on the Commerce Clause in examining
the validity and scope of the warning requirements. 2s8 While the lower
court upheld the basic warning requirements for cigar advertising, it
specifically exempted cigar advertising on the Internet and in national
magazines.28 9 In fact, during oral argument, the Massachusetts Attor-
ney General acknowledged "the uncertainty of the application of the
Regulations to the Internet."290 Later, the Commonwealth attempted
to persuade the district court that while the general warnings applied
to Internet cigar ads, the regulations specifying size and format re-
quirements did not.2 9 1
Noting that this interpretation was not part of the formal rule-
making process, the district court interpreted the warning regulations
narrowly to avoid applying them to Internet advertising. 292 Although
it upheld the advertising warnings, the lower court was clearly con-
cerned about the practical and legal problems raised by state regula-
tion of Internet-based advertising. According to the court, "Internet-
based advertising is targeted at no state in particular, but at all states
in general."2 9 3
In Consolidated Cigar, the First Circuit rejected the lower court's
approach and found that the advertising warning regulation was "not
fairly susceptible to the narrowing construction."294 Refusing to im-
pute exceptions for the Internet or national magazines, the appellate
court concluded that the Massachusetts cigar advertising warnings un-
graphic, or pictorial statement" made by the cigar industry to promote cigar sales in Massa-
chusetts. Id. § 22.03.
Cigar packaging was also subject to warning requirements. See id. § 22.04. The appel-
late court overturned these warning requirements on Commerce Clause grounds. See Con-
solidated Cigar, 218 F.3d at 57.
287. 84 F. Supp. 2d 180 (D. Mass. 2000).
288. See id. at 198-204; Consolidated Cigar, 218 F.3d at 55-58. Both the lower and appel-
late courts ruled that the warning requirements passed muster under the First Amend-
ment. See Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 196-98; Consolidated Cigar, 218 F.3d at 54-55. Notably,
the First Circuit found that all of the tobacco regulations, including, inter alia, those re-
stricting the location of outdoor cigar advertising and height of indoor cigar advertising,
satisfied the First Amendment. See Consolidated Cigar, 218 F.3d at 54-55.
289. See Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 204.
290. Id. at 203 (citing Transcript of Hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment at 11
(Dec. 2, 1999)).
291. See id. (citing Letter from the Attorney General's Office to Young, C.J. at 2 (Dec.
23, 1999)).
292. See id. at 204.
293. Id. at 203.
294. Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30, 55 (1st Cir. 2000).
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duly burdened interstate commerce. 29 5 The court found under the
Pike test that the burden on interstate commerce was "clearly exces-
sive" in relation to the legitimate goal of informing Massachusetts con-
sumers of the deleterious health effects of cigar smoking.296
B. State Regulation of Tobacco Sales on the Internet
To date, Massachusetts appears to be the only state that has
flirted with regulating cigar advertising on the Internet. Other states,
however, are trying to curtail sales of tobacco products to minors over
the Internet.2 97
Rhode Island recently enacted legislation intended to reduce
young people's ability to purchase tobacco products, including cigars,
via the Internet.298 This legislation places the burden on the Internet
retailer to establish that its tobacco customers are of legal age.299 Prior
to shipping any tobacco product into Rhode Island, an Internet re-
tailer must verify that the customer is at least eighteen years of age,
through attaining and attesting that the customer's photo identifica-
tion correctly identifies the purchaser and provides his or her ad-
dress.300 In addition, the Internet retailer must deliver the tobacco
product by a postal or package delivery service which either limits de-
livery to that purchaser, requiring that he or she provide a signature
personally to receive the delivery, or which requires an adult signature
at the purchaser's address to receive the package. 30 1
295. See id. at 55-56 (quoting the lower court's reasoning, in creating exceptions for
Internet and national magazine advertising, in support of its conclusion that that the
state's interest in informing consumers of the health risk of cigar smoking is outweighed by
the burden placed on interstate commerce).
296. See id.
297. In addition to the state legislation discussed herein, the Washington State Liquor
Control Board has used its enforcement authority to issue a "cease and desist" order to
several tobacco manufacturers and retailers requiring them to stop selling cigarettes, bidis,
and other tobacco products to minors over the Internet in the State of Washington. See
Ziggy's Order, supra note 57, at 1. The cease and desist order arose after several minors,
who were apparently participating in a sting operation, ordered and obtained cartons of
bidis over the Internet. See id. at 1-2. Four of the five minors were not asked to provide any
age-related information. See id. at 2. One teenaged purchaser was asked her age when she
placed the online order, but not her date of birth. See id. The bidis ordered by the minors
were all flavored products, some of which were ordered from a cigar manufacturer and a
cigar retailer (for example, Uptown Cigar Co. and Calabash Habana Cigar Caf6). See id.
For further discussion of the ease with which minors obtain cigars online, see supra Part I.
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The New York legislature recently approved an act that requires
shippers to deliver Internet cigarette purchases to a licensed cigarette
retailer.302 New York Governor George Pataki is expected to sign the
bill in the fall of 2000.303 Under this law, a customer would be re-
quired to present a valid photo identification and pay the state ciga-
rette tax to the retailer in order to receive tobacco products
purchased over the Internet.30 4 This legislation is intended to both
reduce the number of minors purchasing tobacco over the Internet,
and ensure that individuals purchasing tobacco products via the In-
ternet pay the state cigarette tax.30 5 Interestingly, the New York regu-
lation places liability for non-compliance on both the shipper and the
retailer.30 6 Problems arise, however, from the extension of liability to
the shipping agent.30 7 The carrier liability provision is weakened be-
cause the state cannot regulate deliveries by the United States Postal
Service.10  This loophole effectively negates the effect of the carrier
liability provisions of the legislation. 30 9 Further, it is expected that
Federal Express, United Parcel Service, and the New York State Motor
Truck Association will challenge the legality of the carrier provisions
on grounds of state interference with interstate commerce as well as
the creation of an unfair competitive advantage. 310 Fortunately, New
York legislators had the foresight to include a severability clause in
this act.31' Thus, if the courts were to strike down the carrier liability
provisions, the Internet retailer liability provisions would still stand.
312
302. See S. 8177, 23rd Leg. § 2 (N.Y. 1999).
303. See James M. Odato, Cigarette Bill Opposition Growing, THE TIMES UNION, July 17,
2000, at Al.
304. See S. 8177, 23rd Leg. §§ 1-2 (N.Y. 1999).
305. See Regulating Cyber-Smokes, THE BUFFALO NEWS, July 4, 2000, at 2B.
306. See S. 8177, 23rd Leg. § 2 (N.Y. 1999).
307. See Agnes Palazzetti, Battle Shifts Over Cigarette Sales on Internet, THE BUFFALO NEWS,
June 30, 2000, at IC, 6C; see also Odato, supra note 303, at Al; Regulating Cyber-Smokes, supra
note 305, at 2B.
308. See Palazzetti, supra note 307, at 6C; Odato, supra note 303, at Al.
309. See Odato, supra note 303, at Al.
310. See Palazzetti, supra note 307, at 1C, 6C; see also Odato, supra note 303, at Al.
Norman Black, national media manager for UPS, stated: "After studying the legislation,
our attorneys think this legislation is terribly misguided by attempting to place us in this
law enforcement role." Palazzetti, supra note 307, at 1C. The Seneca Indian Reservation is
also threatening legal action based on an alleged agreement with New York Governor
Pataki that such legislation would not apply to the Senecas. See id.; see also Regulating Cyber-
Smokes, supra note 305, at 2B. Gerald DeLuca, of the New York State Motor Truck Associa-
tion, stated: "We question the constitutionality of it; it's regulating interstate sales and in-
terstate commerce." Odato, supra note 303, at Al.
311. See S. 8177, 23rd Leg. § 12 (N.Y. 1999).
312. See id.
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In order to prevent the purchase of tobacco products by minors,
it is undoubtedly more effective to require a purchaser to present his
or her identification to a retailer in person, than to allow the pur-
chaser to send a scanned copy over the Internet. States adopting In-
ternet tobacco sales laws should therefore require any individual
purchasing tobacco products via the Internet to present a valid photo
identification at a licensed tobacco retailer in order to receive his or
her purchases. Carrier liability provisions would be highly ineffective,
considering states cannot regulate the United States Postal Service
(and such provisions are prone to legal attack by non-government par-
cel carriers). Thus, states should not include carrier liability provisions
in such legislation. Rather, Internet retailers should be required to
ship tobacco products purchased over the Internet to licensed retail-
ers, which have adequate safeguards to ensure that minors are not
receiving these products.
State regulation of the sale of cigars on the Internet avoids Com-
merce Clause concerns surrounding state regulation of advertise-
ments. Unlike merely posting an advertisement on the Web,
completing a sale entails the gathering of personal information about
the purchaser, such as his or her age or residence. A purchaser's resi-
dence is particularly important because it identifies the exact state,
county, and town for which the retailer should determine the applica-
ble consumer protection laws, regulations, and ordinances. In the
case of cigar sales over the Internet, a municipality or its board of
health could merely restrict all tobacco sales to direct, face-to-face ex-
changes. Thus, Internet sales of tobacco products in that municipality
would be prohibited.
Applying the Pike balancing test, the burden on national tobacco
sales over the Internet would not seem to outweigh the local benefits.
Restricting the sale of tobacco products to direct, face-to-face ex-
changes would benefit the local interest of reducing youth access to
tobacco products. Equipped with a database of local tobacco control
laws, retailers could easily identify whether they should complete a
sale after they identify their customer's residence. The tobacco re-
tailer is no longer burdened with not knowing when and to which
specific consumer protection laws it should adhere.
IV. First Amendment Barriers to Restricting Cigar
Advertising on the Internet
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech
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.... "1313 While the framers of the Constitution probably did not fore-
see that an explosion of communications technology would create a
myriad of new forms of speech, they clearly intended the freedom of
speech to endure.
The right to free speech is not absolute. 314 Some forms of speech,
including obscenity,3 15 child pornography, 31 6 libel,317 and "fighting
words,"'31 8 are not entitled to protection under the First Amendment.
Even when speech is clearly sheltered by the First Amendment, a gov-
ernment restriction on speech will not necessarily fail if legally chal-
lenged. 319 The outcome of a First Amendment challenge often
depends on which standard of review the court applies, generally de-
termined by the type of speech restriction in dispute. A thorough
analysis of the various rules courts use to review speech restrictions is
beyond the scope of this article.320 For our purposes, examining the
313. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment applies to all branches of the federal
and state governments via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well
as to Congress. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664-66 (1925). The full text of the
First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
314. See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (holding that the First
Amendment "obviously was not 'intended to give immunity for every possible use of
language").
315. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining speech as obscene and
unprotected by the First Amendment when it: (1) appeals to the prurient interest accord-
ing to community standards; (2) describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way; and
(3) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value).
316. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982).
317. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
318. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
319. See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951).
320. For an overview of the complex array of issues raised by judicial review of speech
under the First Amendment, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, Rights of Communication and Expres-
sion, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 576-736 (2d ed. 1988). There are many analytical
distinctions beyond the commercial versus political standards. For example, a speech re-
striction which is content neutral, but limits the time, place, or manner of protected
speech is subject to a different standard of review. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949) (upholding a ban on sound trucks); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988)
(upholding a ban on picketing in front of certain residences). Such restrictions on time,
place, and manner must further a significant government interest through a narrowly tai-
lored means. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484-88. The time, place, and manner doctrine, how-
ever, is not applicable to restrictions on tobacco advertising. Cf Penn Advertising of
Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), modified and adhered to,
101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996) wherein the Fourth Circuit treated outdoor tobacco advertis-
ing regulations as a location instead of a message limit for preemption (but not First
Amendment) purposes. See discussion infra pages 49.
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distinction between commercial speech and political or artistic speech
will suffice.
A. Commercial Versus Political Speech
Generally, advertising restrictions are not subject to strict scru-
tiny.321 Rather, courts apply the less rigorous standard of review for
commercial speech set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission.322 Under the four-part test in Central Hudson,
the court'examines whether: (1) the speech is misleading or concerns
unlawful activity; (2) the government has a substantial interest in regu-
lating the speech; (3) the restriction directly (and materially) ad-
vances the government's interest; and (4) the regulation "is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."323
The Central Hudson test should be applied to regulations limiting
Internet tobacco advertising, insuring that a well-tailored restriction
intended to deter illegal tobacco sales to minors will satisfy First
Amendment concerns. This Article examines advertising restrictions
on the Internet, a relatively new and unregulated electronic medium.
The United States Supreme Court has also made some distinctions
concerning different media in reviewing First Amendment chal-
lenges.324 Accordingly, it is necessary to discuss briefly some media-
specific rules and a recent Supreme Court decision striking down a
non-commercial Internet speech restriction.325
Content restrictions on protected speech, like those challenged
in Reno, receive the highest form of First Amendment protection. 326
In such cases, the government must prove it has a compelling interest
in limiting the speech, and that it has chosen a narrowly tailored
means to achieve that goal, otherwise the restriction will be invalid. 327
Satisfying the "narrowly tailored" requirement is extremely difficult,
321. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the government must put forth a compelling state
interest and particular speech restriction must be the least restrictive means necessary to
fulfill the compelling state interest. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989).
322. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The United States Supreme Court first recognized that com-
mercial speech is protected under the First Amendment in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
323. Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566.
324. See discussion infra Part V.B.
325. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
326. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 857-58 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (Buckwalier, J., con-
curring), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
327. See Reno. 521 U.S. at 854.
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particularly if the regulation arguably sweeps too broadly.328 Indeed,
speech restrictions intended to protect children are often struck down
as overbroad because judges reason that they might chill protected
adult speech. 329
In Reno, the United States Supreme Court struck down provisions
of the CDA, a federal law that criminalized the act of "knowingly"
transmitting obscene or indecent messages to minors. 330 The Court
was "persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amend-
ment requires when a statute regulates the content of speech. 33 t
While agreeing that the goal of protecting minors from potentially
harmful speech is laudable, the Court reasoned that the law would
impermissibly burden speech which adults otherwise have a right to
send and receive. 332 Indeed, the Court cited other First Amendment
cases where adult free-speech rights trumped the government's inter-
est in protecting minors. 333 However, both the result and reasoning in
Reno are easily distinguished from restrictions on youth access to cigar
advertising on the Internet. As the Supreme Court recognized in Reno:
[U]nlike the regulations upheld in Ginzberg and Pacifica, the scope
of the CDA is not limited to commercial speech or commercial
entities. Its open-ended prohibitions embrace all non-profit enti-
ties and individuals posting indecent messages or displaying them
on their own computers in the presence of minors. 33 4
There are no First Amendment rulings on cigar (or tobacco) ad-
vertising on the Internet. 335 Outdoor tobacco advertising restrictions,
however, have withstood First Amendment legal challenges in two
328. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
329. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983) (striking
down as overbroad a law that prohibited mailing of unsolicited contraceptive
advertisements).
330. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 858-60, 874.
331. Id. at 874.
332. See id.
333. First, the Court acknowledged that "we have repeatedly recognized the govern-
mental interest in protecting children from harmful materials." Id. at 875 n.40 (citations
omitted). However, it then explained: "The Government may not 'reduce the adult popu-
lation' . . . to ...only what is fit for children." Id. at 875 (citing Denver Area Educ.
Telecomm., Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 759 (1996)). Reaching back to yet another First
Amendment decision, the Court added: "[R] egardless of the strength of the government's
interest in protecting children, '[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot
be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox."' Id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983)) (alteration in original).
334. Id. at 877.
335. For a discussion relating to the Massachusetts federal district court decision in
Lorillard (concluding that cigar advertising regulations, requiring health warning on cigar
advertisement in Massachusetts, do not apply to Internet advertising), and the First Circuit
Court Court of Appeals opinion in Consolidated Cigar (reversing and concluding that the
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cases.336 In the first case, Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of
Baltimore,33 7 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a local law
restricting the location of outdoor tobacco billboards under the Cen-
tral Hudson test for commercial speech. 33 8 A key challenge in the case
was persuading the court that the purpose of the regulation was to
thwart illegal tobacco sales to minors. 339 Indeed, the court in Penn
Advertising upheld the ordinance protecting children from intrusive
tobacco advertising, while recognizing that the limit would also affect
adults.340 Penn Advertising is distinguishable from Reno because, in
Penn Advertising, only commercial speech was restricted and thus the
challenged regulation was reviewed under a lower standard of review.
This is the appropriate standard of review for a regulation limiting
tobacco advertising on the Internet that appeals to or targets minors.
In Lorillard, recently upheld in Consolidated Cigar, the tobacco in-
dustry challenged, inter alia, state restrictions on cigarette, smokeless
tobacco, and cigar advertising. 34 1 A United States District Court in
Massachusetts, applying the Central Hudson test, rejected the tobacco
industry's argument that the court should strictly scrutinize the to-
bacco regulations. 342 The court noted that the first prong of the Cen-
challenged warning regulations include Internet (and national magazine) cigar advertising
and thus fail the Pike Commerce Clause test), see discussion supra Part III.A.2.
336. See Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2000) (upholding
outdoor and indoor advertising restrictions for cigars as well as cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco); see also Penn Adver., Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995),
modified and adhered to, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996).
One lower court struck down similar tobacco advertising regulations on both preemp-
tion and First Amendment grounds. See Rockwood v. City of Burlington, 21 F. Supp. 2d 411
(D. Vt. 1998); see also Missouri Retailers Ass'n v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:98CV1514 ERW
(E.D. Mo. 1999) (challenging similar tobacco advertising restrictions after the ordinance
was struck down because it potentially regulated noncommercial speech).
Currently, two federal courts are considering on remand whether similar outdoor to-
bacco advertising restrictions comport with the First Amendment. See Federation of Adver.
Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 189 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999); Greater N.Y.
Metro. Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani, 195 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1999).
337. 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995).
338. See id. at 1318.
339. See id. at 1321. Offering this rationale was also critical to rebutting the industry's
claim that the ordinance was preempted by the FCLAA. See id. at 1321-23. Ironically, be-
cause cigars have largely escaped federal regulation, FCLAA preemption does not apply to
cigars. See Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30, 38 n.3 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting
that "the FCLAA applies only to cigarettes" and not smokeless tobacco, or, by inference,
cigars).
340. See Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1325.
341. See Lorillard Tobacco Corp. v. Reilly, 84 F. Supp. 2d 180, 182 (D. Mass 2000);
MAss. REG. CODE tit. 940 §§ 21.04(5)(a)-(b), 22.06(5)(a)-(b) (2000).
342. See Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. at 184-85. Specifically, the lower court rejected the to-
bacco companies attempt to analogize the case to Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
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tral Hudson test, which requires the speech be neither misleading nor
concerning illegal activity, was uncontested.3 43 The nature of the gov-
ernment's interest-to reduce underage smoking-was also undis-
puted,344 although the industry questioned whether it was substantial
enough to satisfy Central Hudson . 3 45
The district court then concluded that the state had shown that
the advertising restriction "would substantially advance its interest
in curtailing underage smoking. ' 346 Finally, the court examined
the fit between the advertising regulation and the state govern-
ment's goal, and asked whether the restriction was more exten-
sive than necessary.3 47 This inquiry did not require the speech
regulation to be the least restrictive alternative available.' 48
678 (1977), which involved advertising of contraceptives, thereby implicating the funda-
mental right to privacy and triggering strict scrutiny. See Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 184-85.
The court likened tobacco advertising to pornography in the first heading of its opinion:
I. CIGARETTE ADVERTISING IS FUNCTIONAL PORNOGRAPHY. The meta-
phor is apt. Both are entirely legal. Both are spawned by and supported by multi-
billion-dollar industries generating significant economic activity. While ostensibly
clucking in disapproval, millions of adult Americans support each industry with
considerable cash outlays yet seek to have the government teach our children to
avoid that which so many of us eagerly purchase.
Id. at 182. The comparison is particularly interesting considering the reluctance other
courts have expressed to uphold restrictions on pornography (which is treated as content
restriction) intended to shield children, if adult access might also be chilled. See, e.g.,
ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115 (1989).
343. See Lorillard, 84 F. Stipp. 2d at 185-86. Notably, however, the Massachusetts Attor-
ney General did "not concede that the targeted advertising qualifies for protection, since it
might be seen to induce illegal activity." Id. Commentators have also suggested that certain
tobacco advertising targeting minors could be viewed as illegal activity, unprotected by the
First Amendment. See Edward 0. Correia, State and Local Regulation of Cigarette Advertising,
23 NOTRE DAME L.J. OF LEG. 1, 27 (1997). To date this argument has not been pursued in
litigation.
344. See Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
345. See id. The federal district court in Lorillard relied on the reasoning in Penn Adver-
tising to reject this position. The court also rejected the industry's attempt to analogize the
case to 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), which held that Rhode
Island's complete ban on price advertising for alcoholic beverages violated the First
Amendment. Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 186. The court in Lorillard noted that the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts intends to "target the prevalence of an illegal activity-under-
age smoking-not to restrict information from reaching adult smokers or to place a 'vice'
label on smoking." Id.
346. Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
347. See id. at 189-93 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
New York, 477 U.S. 557 (1980)).
348. See id. at 189 (citing Board of Trustees of the State of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 475 (1989)); see also Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d
1318, 1323 (4th Cir. 1995), modified and adhered to, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996). The Massa-
chusetts federal district court noted that the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test is
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Rather, the court essentially asked whether the fit was "reason-
able."349
Thus, the court in Lorillard examined the particulars of the chal-
lenged location restrictions. It found sufficient basis to uphold the
ban on outdoor tobacco advertising within 1,000 feet of specified ar-
eas where children congregate (schools and playing fields, for exam-
ple), but struck down the under-five-foot height limitation for indoor
advertising. 350 On appeal, the First Circuit upheld the district court's
approval of the outdoor advertising restrictions and reversed the
lower court's invalidation of the indoor advertising height
restrictions.3 5 1
The district court equated cigars with cigarettes for First Amend-
ment purposes and rejected the cigar manufacturers' and retailers'
arguments that their products were materially different.3 5 2 "As this
[c]ourt rules that cigars and cigarettes are indistinguishable for the
purposes of First Amendment advertising protection, the Central Hud-
son analysis is the same as that for cigarettes." 53 The appeals court,
however, did not embrace the district court's approach, noting that
"we have some difficulty accepting the Attorney General's suggestion
that 'what is good for cigarettes is good for cigars,' at least in the First
Amendment context."354 The First Circuit concluded, however, that
the Attorney General had presented sufficient product-specific infor-
mation to conclude that restricting the locations of advertising for cig-
arettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars would "directly advance" the
State's interests in curtailing youth tobacco use and tobacco sales to
minors.355
The appellate court in Consolidated Cigar specifically concluded
that the Attorney General "sufficiently demonstrated that cigar use
derived from the "time-place-manner" doctrine applied to restrictions targeting the effect
(rather than the content) of speech. See Larillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 189 (citing Greater New
Orleans Broad. Ass'n., Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999)).
349. See Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
350. See id. at 193. The lower court rejected indoor advertising limit (commonly known
as a point of sale restriction) because the State articulated no specific rationale for the
numerical height limit on indoor advertising. See id. By contrast, the court found the
State's reliance on the FDA's finding and challenged regulation restricting outdoor adver-
tising sufficient to support the outdoor restrictions. See id. at 192.
351. See Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30, 36-37 (1st Cir. 2000).
352. See Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 195.
353. Id.
354. Consolidated Cigar, 218 F.3d at 45.
355. Id. at 49. This was part of the court's analysis under the third prong of Central
Hudson.
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among minors poses a real danger in Massachusetts. '" 356 Moreover, in
considering whether the cigar advertising restrictions "would alleviate
the cited harms to a material degree"-another requirement under
Central Hudson-the court rejected the cigar industry's claim that its
relatively low level of spending on outdoor advertising meant the reg-
ulations could not reasonably be expected to reduce in-state cigar
consumption. 357 "Although fewer children will be affected by cigar ad-
vertising, simply because there is much less of it, the relative lack of
cigar advertising also means that the burden imposed on cigar adver-
tisers is correspondingly small."3' 5 8
Emphasizing that Massachusetts need not choose the "least re-
strictive means,"'3 59 the First Circuit, reversing the district court's find-
ings, concluded that the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test was
satisfied for all of the tobacco product advertising regulations includ-
ing indoor advertising restrictions, and did not violate the First
Amendment.360 Although the First Circuit expressed some reservation
about the effectiveness of the five-foot minimum height requirement
for certain indoor advertising, it concluded the regulation was "within
the range of reasonableness in which the Attorney General is best
suited to pass judgment. '361
While the Consolidated Cigar case involved different and arguably
distinguishable advertising media, the appellate court's decision to
uphold both indoor and outdoor cigar advertising restrictions under
the First Amendment is a significant precedent.
B. Media-Specific Rules
In addition to carving out a special rule for commercial speech,
the United States Supreme Court has taken a media-specific approach
to speech restrictions, in particular electronic fora for communica-
tion, such as radio,362 telephone, 363 and television.3 64 Arguably, the
Internet could be analogized to, or distinguished from, one or more
of these particular media and the relevant rule would be applied. If,
356. Id. at 47.
357. Id. at 47-49.
358. Id. at 49.
359. See id. at 49-50.
360. See id. at 50.
361. Id. at 51.
362. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
363. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
364. See Turner Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Denver Area Educ.
Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
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for example, the Internet was treated like a radio broadcast, a speech
restriction intended to protect children might pass First Amendment
scrutiny, even if it also limited adult access to speech.365 The Supreme
Court decision concerning radio broadcast in FCC v. Pacifica3 66 is par-
ticularly noteworthy because it involved protected,3 67 non-commercial
speech, and the government action was intended to protect
children.3 68
In Pacifica, the United States Supreme Court applied a lower stan-
dard of review because it viewed radio broadcasting as distinct from
other communication media.3 69 The Court, in finding that the regula-
tions did not violate the First Amendment, relied in part on radio's
pervasive nature and easy access to children. 370 These two features are
also characteristics of the Internet, particularly in view of its ubiqui-
tous presence in modern American homes and the ease with which
many children navigate the World Wide Web.
While a radio listener is arguably more passive than a computer
user, the two forms of media are not so far apart. A radio listener may
have less control over the messages he hears than a computer user has
with the content she or he sees. With, however, the increasing com-
mercialization of the Web and the intrusiveness of unsolicited com-
mercial messages, today's computer user may readily stumble across
unwanted material while surfing the Web or even while accessing e-
mail.3 7 ' At best, the United States Supreme Court's characterization
in Reno of the degree of control an Internet user has over what ap-
pears on his screen may be both outdated and overly optimistic. 3 72
365. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732 (holding that the FCC has the power to regulate the
time of an indecent radio broadcast).
366. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
367. The speech in issue was indecent but not obscene. See id. at 729.
368. See id. at 748-49.
369. See id. at 748.
370. See id. at 749.
371. The authors regularly receive solicitation messages when accessing their e-mail
thorough America On Line ("AOL"). This is a relatively new, involuntary feature of AOL's
e-mail service which requires the user to take affirmative action to by-pass the commercial
message before reading her incoming mail.
372. The district court's findings of fact pertaining to the Internet were made in 1996.
For example, at that time the court held, in Finding No. 73, that "[d]espite its limitations,
currently available user-based software suggests that a reasonably effective method by
which parents can prevent their children from accessing sexually explicit and other mate-
rial which parents may believe is inappropriate for their children will soon be widely availa-
ble." ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affid, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). The
court also expressly held, in Finding No. 88, that Internet communication does not appear
by accident on computer screens. See id. at 844. Cf CME YOUTH ACCESS REPORT, supra note
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Although the Supreme Court declined in Reno to create an In-
ternet-specific First Amendment standard, 373 the nature of this rela-
tively new media and judicial reluctance to interfere in its
development were clearly at work. Furthermore, the Court has not
been eager to apply Pacifica's lower standard of review to other elec-
tronic media, reasoning, for example, that neither telephones374 nor
televisions375 share the unique characteristics that distinguish radio
broadcasts for First Amendment purposes. In Sable Communications of
California, Inc. v. FCC,3 76 the Supreme Court struck down a law in-
tended to protect children from accessing commercial "dial-a-porn"
messages over the telephone. 377 The Court distinguished "dial-a-porn"
from the radio broadcast in Pacifica, reasoning that indecent tele-
phone communications are not as pervasive or as accessible to chil-
dren as radio, or even television, broadcasts might be.3 78
A comparison of the three media (radio, television, and the In-
ternet) and the degree of user control over the content viewed or
heard is instructive. Internet images and messages-including those
which are either commercial in nature (such as tobacco advertising)
or indecent-are arguably not as invasive as the indecent radio broad-
cast in Pacifica, which caught by surprise an unsuspecting parent lis-
tening to the car radio while chauffeuring his son. However, the
chance that a child might stumble upon adult material on the In-
ternet is certainly greater than the chance a child might mistakenly
dial a pornographic telephone service.
The Supreme Court's decisions since Pacifica appear to be a de-
liberate move away from a media-driven3 79 First Amendment inquiry,
and toward a focus primarily on the type of speech being restricted.
The commercial nature of tobacco advertising on the Internet dictates
35, at 3 (concluding that stand-alone filters do not effectively block alcohol and tobacco
content on the Web). See also discussion of filtering devices supra Part I.F.
373. See ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 867-68 (1997) (agreeing with the district court's
conclusion "that our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment
scrutiny that should be applied to this medium"; rather, the Court applied the strict scru-
tiny standard, viewing the CDA as a content based regulation of protected speech).
374. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
375. See Turner Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Denver Area Educ.
Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
376. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
377. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28.
378. See id.
379. The predictable application of a media-specific rules to speech restrictions is also
complicated by the developing convergence of the Internet (which involves computer and
telephone lines) with television and radio. See Eric Schmuckler, The Bandwidth Blues,
FORBES, May 22, 2000, at 32; see also discussion supra Part I.
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that the Central Hudson intermediate standard of review would apply
to online cigar advertising. Strict scrutiny would not apply simply be-
cause tobacco promotional material appears on the Internet instead
of a billboard. 380
Conclusion
Cigar consumption among the young, and the ubiquitous nature
of Internet cigar promotion, suggests that cigar advertising restric-
tions could be an important public health tool. Currently, cigar adver-
tising on the Internet, as with virtually all forms of Internet
advertising, is unregulated.
Two federal agencies, the FTC and FCC, potentially have the le-
gal authority to limit cigar advertising on the Internet. Recently, the
FTC considered proposed Consent Orders which, if accepted, would
require seven major cigar manufacturers to carry health warnings on
certain cigar packages and advertising. The warning requirement,
however, would only extend to Internet cigar advertising of the seven
respondent companies.
Extending the FCC's statutory ban on electronic tobacco advertis-
ing to encompass all cigar products, as the FTC recommended in its
1999 cigar report to Congress, would be the most efficient tool for
banning cigar advertising on the Internet. Indeed, a commitment to
enforce an expanded ban could eliminate most tobacco advertising
on the Internet.
A newly reconstituted FDA or the creation of a new Internet fed-
eral agency are other possibilities, both of which would require new
legislation. State and local regulation of Internet tobacco advertising,
while not impossible, also presents significant legal obstacles. A fed-
eral approach appears to be preferable.
Any attempt to regulate Internet cigar advertising will probably
be subject to a First Amendment challenge. However, a carefully
targeted approach restricting youth access to cigar advertising could
satisfy the First Amendment requirements for commercial speech.
Given the novel technical issues presented by the Internet, and the
380. Cf ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). See also Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Reilly,
218 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2000) (distinguishing Reno and United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1878 (2000), where the Supreme Court considered another govern-
ment attempt to restrict speech to protect children, because those cases involved "expres-
sive speech, rather than commercial speech, and therefore the government applied a
'strict scrutiny' standard to invalidate the laws, rather than the intermediate scrutiny appli-
cable to commercial speech cases").
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lack of reliable methods for limiting youth access to Internet Web
sites, a properly empowered federal agency would likely be in a better
position than Congress to craft legally defensible regulations to limit
youth access to cigar sites. Extending the FCC ban on electronic ad-
vertising to all cigars, and enforcing that ban across the board, could
side-step many, if not all, of these potential obstacles.
